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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The estuarine set bagnet communities are amongst the poorest 
rural communities in Bangladesh. An already difficult existence 
has been exacerbated by recent natural disasters and apparent 
declines in fish stock. In addition, they are socially and 
politically isolated from the mainstream of rural life, often 
coming from ethnic minorities and dependent on marketing channels 
that are dominated by the urban and rural elite. 
This report presents the findings of a year-long study of three 
set bagnet communities that arose from planners' fears that 
intervention in such marginalised communities would exacerbate 
rather than assist the fisherfolk's situation. The communities 
are from three different religious and ethnic groups in different 
parts of eastern Bangladesh. 
The findings show the intricate web of social and economic 
factors that hinder economic development. Lack of access to 
capital is a major issue. Most of the available credit is linked 
to the marketing of high-value fish during certain seasons. 
Consequently, external financing is channelled through boat 
captains and owners, excluding women and poorer men from directly 
accessing loans. Furthermore, for much of the year, when the 
value of the catch is insufficient for large traders, credit is 
unavailable. 
In recent years NGOs have tried to address this situation, but 
the results to date are mixed. The study has identified many of 
the features of the fisherfolk's lives that serve as 
opportunities and constraints to such outside assistance. It 
shows that there are no magic solutions, but only slow, 
persistent and socially sensitive responses which might release 
some of the present pressures and open up possibilities for the 
future. 
The report is primarily intended for use by the ODA Bay of Bengal 
Post-harvest Fisheries Project, and articles on specific aspects 
of the study are being published elsewhere. However, the report, 
and especially its final section (Conclusions), will also be of 
use to fisheries policy makers and development practitioners who 
need to increase their understanding of the complexity of coastal 
fishing communities and the implications for development work. 
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SECTION 1: BACKGROUND 
The Bay of Bengal Project has had an interest in the set bagnet 
communities of Bangladesh since the early 1990s. In 1992-1993 
the FAO-funded Bay of Bengal Project (BOBP) conducted a 
biological and socio-economic macro study of the estuarine set 
bagnet fishery. In the same year the ODA Bay of Bengal Post-
harvest Fisheries Project (ODA-PHFP) conducted a study of 
marketing as it affected these communities, and in 1993 
commissioned a thirteen-month micro-level study of social and 
economic factors affecting these communities. 
There was already baseline data on set bagnet communities from a 
previous FAO-funded study, the work of Bennett (1991) and data 
from NGOs. It was therefore decided to conduct an in-depth study 
of just three communities. 
Such a long study period of a small group is rare on development 
projects, and was an acknowledgment of the complexity of the set 
bagnet communities' social and economic situation. For although 
it was clear that these communities were amongst the poorest in 
rural Bangladesh, the complexity of this poverty made it 
impossible to plan successful interventions without the risk of 
marginalising and adding to the immiseration of groups within 
these communities. 
It was also apparent that some of the communities did not trust 
development workers, and saw them as the type of 'development 
tourist' characterised in some of Robert Chambers' writings of 
the 1970s, paying brief, one-off visits that usually led to 
nothing. Thus when we paid an initial visit to Delipara, after a 
brief exchange of niceties, we were asked where was our 
questionnaire. It was therefore essential to gain the trust of 
the communities through frequent and prolonged contact prior to 
developing any concrete plans. 
It was equally clear that the communities themselves were best 
placed to decide what types of intervention were necessary and 
1 
Caught In Their Own Nets 
feasible. Again this required sustained contact, not only to 
build trust but because the history of natural disasters in these 
communities had led to people seeing development organisations as 
indistinguishable from relief work. The idea of community 
involvement in the planning and implementation process was 
something new and would take time to develop. 
METHODOLOGY 
A set of guidelines was developed in order to focus the initial 
field work, and these were adapted and developed as the study 
progressed (Annex I). A range of techniques were tried - some 
extractive, some participatory in nature. Each community was 
involved in a mapping exercise that developed into an informal 
census documenting the social and economic composition of 
households, the inter-relationship of households and the economic 
resources of each community. The methodology developed is the 
subject of a forthcoming NRI publication. 
In addition, community members were interviewed individually and 
in groups, and discussions were held with interest-groups and key 
respondents. Prior to the end of the field work, the communities 
were involved in discussions of the findings, and nominated 
representative to attend a workshop to present the findings to 
BOBP, the government, donor organisations and NGOs at a workshop 
in Dhaka in July 1994. The results of this two-day workshop were 
used to develop a plan for future interventions. This was 
discussed with ODA-PHFP and ODA to determine the boundaries of 
ODA-PHFP involvement, and was then discussed with each community. 
A logframe outlining this plan is presented at Annex II. 
This report presents the major findings of the field work with 
additional information from the above workshop. It is being 
published in English and Bangla. Particular aspects of the work 
will also be published in relevant journals and presented at 
seminars or other fora. 
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The findings for each community are given using a standardised 
analytical framework . Conclusions are given for each community 
and in the final section general conclusions in relation to 
future inter ventions are provided . 
LOCATIONS 
Weather played a major part in how the research was conducted . 
The monsoon season and storms meant that sever al planned vis i ts 
to Rakhainpara and especially Rehania had to be postponed , and 
this partly accounts for there being more detailed information on 
Delipara than elsewhere . 
SEASONS 
The Bangla year is different from that of the Western or Arabic 
calendars . 1994 A. D. or 1415 (Muslim) is 1401 in Bangladesh . 
There are twelve months in the Bangla calendar : Boishak, 
Joishtho , Ashar , Sraban , Bhadra , Aswin , Kartik, Agrahan , Poush , 
Magh , falgun and Choitro . Months are adj usted to the lunar cycle 
and most months last between 29- 31 days , although in rare 
instances a month may be 32 days . Thus , for instance , 15 May 
1993 corresponds to the Bangla date 1 Joishtho 1400 . 
Bangla months have been used throughout this repo~~ . 
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SECTION 2: DELIPARA 
THE COMMUNITY 
Location 
Delipara is located on the south-eastern coast of Bangladesh, 17 
kilometres north of Chittagong and a kilometre west of 
Fouzdarhat. It is part of North Salimpur village, in Kumira 
thana, Chittagong district (Map 1). 
The settlement sits on a shallow bay facing directly onto the Bay 
of Bengal, on a narrow band between the sea and the neighbouring 
arable communities. Delipara itself has no arable land, although 
to one side there is an area of boggy, 11nused land that was once 
a ship-breakers' yard. The tightly packed houses of the 
sett~ement sit on the slightly raised land of a stone coastal 
barrier, but the fishing craft are beached on the wide shallow 
beach where the boats are repaired and fish sold. 
The settlement sits on a shallow bay facing directly onto the Bay 
of Bengal, on a narrow band between the sea and the neighbouring 
arable communities. Delipara itself has no arable land, although 
to one side there is an area of boggy, unused land that was once 
a ship-breakers' yard. The tiqhtly packed houses of the 
settlement sit cJn the slightly raised land of a stone coastal 
barrier, but the fishing craft are beached on the wide shallow 
beach where the boats are repaired and fish sold. 
History 
In early times, these communities lived further to the west, but 
over time they have shifted eastwards due to tidal damage and 
erosion along the coastline. The Delipara community alone has 
relocated its settlement three times since the Second World War, 
moving to its present site 25 years ago. Throughout this time, 
except during the war, the community's main source of livelihood 
was fishing. 
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There is a general sense that life was better in bygone days. 
"My father and grandfather and his father lived a good life,'' 
says one elder, "They were all fisherfolk and with their 
traditional gear and methods used to catch enough fish during the 
[hilsa] season for the whole year. The catch of one net alone had 
to be sold by five to six of us. There was prosperity in our 
lives. A son, when born into the family meant another fisherman 
for the household." People feel that there was more fish in the 
past, enough to eat and to distribute amongst friends and 
neighbours in the Muslim non-fishing communities. 
Daughters were married off as soon as they reached puberty, or 
earlier if possible. An old fisherman remembering the 1950s 
recalls that his wife was only eight when they were married. His 
wife lived with her parents after the marriage. According to the 
custom in those days, the groom had to give Tk 60 for the first 
glimpse of the bride, while the bride's parents gave a saree, a 
blouse, a few gold ornaments to the bride, a mattress (pati), 
pillows, katha, utensils and a brass water holder (kalshi). The 
Brahman who conducted the wedding rites was paid Tk 5, and there 
was Tk 20 for the band (30 bairagi singers) and Tk 1,000 for the 
wedding feast. 
As it is remembered today, the community celebrated religious 
rites and ceremonies in grandeur, with all members of the 
community participating with donations and enthusiasm. The 
community sardar (leaders) administered and managed the affairs 
of the community and conflicts, both social and economic, were 
resolved through the joint consensus of the Sardar's. 
The custom in the old days was to deliver the largest fish of the 
catch to some of the prominent farming households during the 
harvest period in Agrahan month. The landlord would also make a 
similar gift of rice to express his goodwill. Requests were made 
in advance for particular fish for feasts and occasions. The 
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price of rice was only Tk 0.02 per seer (0.9 kg). Remembering 
the Sixties, older inhabitants recall that the daily average 
earnings of the fisherfolk was Tk 20 from which they could save 
Tk 5-6. On a rainy day or other days when they could not fish, a 
fisherman's savings were enough to live comfortably. Nowadays, 
even earnings of Tk 100 a day are not enough to make ends meet. 
For reasons rooted in caste, it has always been exceptional when 
community members have sought work outside of fishing, and the 
few who sought non-fishing work lost much of their standing in 
the community. In the Eighties twelve fisherfolk went to the 
Middle East to work as fishing crews and other employment. But 
generally few people have migrated away from Delipara, and except 
through marriage few new people move in to the community, the 
exception being nine households which migrated from Sandwip 
almost three decades ago. 
The only time large numbers left Delipara was during the Second 
World War when there was a great famine in 1941-1942 and only 
four families remained behind. Some found jobs as construction 
workers with a monthly salary of Tk 1, most living and working in 
Chittagong town. One community elder remembers how he purchased 
0.21 acres of land for only Tk 60 just prior to the famine. But 
the l and tax was Tk 5 and he remembers t he difficulty he had 
payi ng t his amount each J~ar. 
The sea claimed his land in the early Sixties, when the villagers 
first grew concerned about the whipping tidal waves which 
threatened to wash away their settlement. The destruction was 
gradual during the Sixties, and gained momentum with the cyclone 
in November 1970. By the Eighties, nearly five hundred meters of 
the community settlement had been lost to the sea. Some of those 
who lost their homesteads bought agricultural land for building 
houses from the surrounding farming communities during the late 
Sixties when the price of land was Tk 1,200 for 0.33 acres. 
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The fishing hamlet, with its bamboo thatch houses is vulnerable 
to the sea whenever storms and occasional cyclones hit the 
unprotected coastline. Inhabitants can cite three to four 
occasions over the past twenty years when their houses have 
either been seriously damaged or completely destroyed by cyclones 
and tidal waves. During the cyclone of 1970 (Nov 7), and 1991 
(April 28), all houses · in the settlement were either washed away 
or so seriously damaged that they had to be rebuilt. 
ENVIRONMENT 
Weather 
Between the months of Joishtho/Ashar and Sraban/Bhadra there are 
rains. Heavy rain means that the small fishing craft cannot go 
to sea and this can disrupt fishing for a week at a time, 
especially during the hilsa season. Sickness is also very common 
at this time, although whether it is a result of the weather or a 
consequence of lack of money to buy medicines when fishing 
activity is forced to stop is unclear. 
The months of Agrahan/Poush until Choitro/Boishak are usually the 
dry season when the sea is calmer and there are is less chance of 
storms or tidal surges . But it is also this period that is 
poorest for fishing. 
The Sea 
As the section on Delipara's history shows the sea has always 
presented a threat to the community, and there is a general 
feeling that erosion has become worse since the 1960s. But the 
Bay of Bengal is also the main source of livelihood for the 
landless inhabitants, and its goddess is much feared by the 
community. 
However, the 1970 cyclone occurred during this period. 
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COMMUNITY SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
The Settlement 
Delipara settlement is a tight knot of huts set either side of 
narrow dirt alleyways, each hut facing to the east or west. Each 
hut occupies between 0.02-0.05 acres and the total land area is 
about 3.5 acres. The boundaries of the settlement are clearly 
demarcated by trees, channels, bamboo fences (bera), the sea and, 
at the eastern entrance, the rocks of the coastal barrier. None 
of the residents owns cultivable land although one person owns a 
pond used for bathing and fishing. 
The main ' pukka' building is the cyclone shelter built by the 
government after the 1991 cyclone. But the mandir (temple) is 
the focal point for communal activities. There is only one pukka 
house in Delipara, owned by the same person who has the largest 
pond. Eight households have electricity, two houses have 
television and about a dozen have radio-cassette players. 
Most of the housing is made of bamboo thatch with either 
corrugated metal roofing (mostly donated after the cyclone) or 
palm leaves. The alleyways act as drainage channels and water 
often floods into the houses during the monsoons. A common 
complaint is overcrowdi ng and some say the population has grown 
four t imes since the community originally moved t o the s i te. 
Demography 
The entire population is Hindu from the jolodas sub-caste of 
fisherfolk. All originate from the same community except for 
nine families which migrated to Delipara from Sandwip. 
The total population is approximately 1400, consisting of 171 
families living in 163 households. Nine households have more 
than one famil y living in them. These are normally married sons 
living with their parents or brothers sharing the same house. 
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There are no instances where two families lived in the same house 
without having blood ties. 
The exact size of households is not known but from a sample of 30 
families, 14 had more than six members, 14 had between four and 
five members and only two had three or less. 
Most households are headed by men (see Table 1), and those 
considered heads of household are normally aged between 36-50 
years. The majority of male-headed households are headed by 
married men, but those headed by females are normally headed by 
widows or divorcees. The number of such households, which are 
commonly recognised throughout the developing worlds as being 
amongst the most vulnerable economically, is relatively high 
( 19%) • 
Occupat:i.on 
The primary occupation of all male household heads is fishing 
which accounts for 54% of all household head employment (Table 
1). This category includes all those involved in planning and 
carrying out fishing expeditions - boat-owners, boat operators, 
po unna who fish from others' craft and contracted fish crews. 
Women do not go fishing, but are often involved in fish trading 
(45%) which is also the primary occupation of 17% of male 
household heads. However, men engaged in trading are in a 
9 
If able 1: Oelipara Population by Occupation of HH Head 
Total Male headed Female headed 
households % households % households % 
Total 171 138 81% 33 19°!. 
Primary Occupation 
Fishing 92 54% 92 67°!. 0 OOfc 
Fish Trading 38 22~ 23 170J. 15 45°A 
Other 1 1~ 0 OOfc 1 30/c 
r!one* 40 23~ 23 17°/c 17 520/c 
""(None includes Unemoloved. Housewife. Retired. Mentally Deficient) 
trable 2: Delipara Population Comparing Occupation and Marital Status of HH 
Head 
Total Male Female 
HHs % headed % headed % 
HHs HHs 
I 
!rota I 171 138 81% 33 19% 
Primary Occupation by Marital Status 
Fishing (married) 89 520/c 89 64°/c 0 Oo/c 
Fishing (non-married) 3 20/c 3 2~ 0 OOfc 
l=ish Trading (manied} 21 120/c 21 150/c 0 0% 
Fish Trading (non-manied) 17 100fc 2 10/c 15 45% 
pther (married) 1 10/c 0 0% 1 3°/c 
Pther (non-manied) 0 OOfc 0 OOA 0 OOfc 
None (manied}' 24 14% 21 15% 3 9o/c 
~one (non-married}' 16 90/c 2 1% 14 42°A 
"(None includes Unemployed. Housewife, Retired. Mentallv Deficient) 
Blowfie1d & Haque 
different position from •t~omen . The former are commonly married 
(Table 2) and regard trading as a step up from fishing . But for 
women , trading is most common amongst widows and divorcees , and 
is on a smaller scale , buying small amounts of fish from the 
daily landings and selling these to nearby communities or 
roadside bazaars . 
There is a relatively high number of household heads without a 
primary occupation , especially amongst women where 52% of female 
household heads have no regular source of income (Table l). This 
confirms the impression that this section of the population is 
economically at risk , although the ezact situation will depend on 
the overall employment situation within the fa mily o r household . 
For instance , one unemplojed widow , although elderly , has fou r 
sons , all of whom are engaged in fishing and are able to care for 
her , whereas a younger divorcee has no children and has a poorer 
economic (and social) status even though she works as a fish 
trader . 
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Table 3: Delipara: Economic relations of retired household heads 
Gender of Age of HH Past Live Number of No. of No. of 
HH head head lihood sons sons sons 
engaged engaged 
in fishing in fish 
trading 
! 
Male 80 fishing 5 0 5 
Male 60 fishing 4 1 0 
Male 75 fishing 3 3 0 
Male over 90 fishing 3 3 0 
Male 70 fishing 5 3 0 
Male 65 fishing 2 2 0 
Male 65 fishing 4 4 0 
Male 65 fishing 1 1 0 
Male 80 fishing 5 5 0 
Table 4: Delipara: Examples of Household Incomes and Expenditures 
Hilsa Season Set Bagnet Loans Amount 
I Income (Tk) Expenditure Season Expenditure Taken (Tk) Due 
Income (Tk) 
16,000 16,000 40-50/day 40-50/day 10,000 1 10,000 
49,000 20,000 o0-60/day p0-80/day 45,000 1 25,000 
29,000 2 9,000 3 
18,000 18,000 ~0-50/day ~0-50/day 0 0 
28,000 16,000 ~0-50/day 40-50/day 18,000 1 6,000 I 
12,000 2 
28,000 16,000 ~0-50/day 40-50/day 15,000 6,000 
14,000 9,000 30-35/day 30-35/day 5,000 3 2.000 
3,000 4 2,000 1 
2,000 2 
21,000 12,000 ~0-45/day ~0-45/day 10,000 1 0 
9,000 
60,000 20,000 ~0-40/day ~0-45/day 20,000 1 0 
20,000 2 
55,000 10,000 40-50/day 40-50/day 0 0 
25,000 5 
16.000 16,000 3_5-40/day ~5-40/day 0 0 
~xplanation : 
1: Outstanding loan to dad on at start of year 
2: Repayment of dadon loan during the season 
~ : Outstanding loan to CODEC 
14: Repayment of CODEC loan during the season 
14: Losses due to boat sinkinq with catch on board 
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All but two male household heads without a primary occupation are 
more then 60 years of age and are effectively retired, largely 
dependent on their children for their subsistence. Each of the 
twelve male household heads who are effectively retired have at 
least one son who is engaged in fishing. In addition nine male 
household heads said they were actually retired. All had 
previously been fishermen, and as Table 3 shows all have sons who 
are still engaged in fishing. 
The employment situation within households is not fully 
understood, but where data are available the primary occupation 
is still fishing. In the majority of households (i.e. those with 
a male head aged more than 35 years) the wife is responsible for 
domestic tasks (cooking, cleaning, obtaining food), the raising 
of children, mending nets and maintaining the house. She will 
also market fish, either in the nearby village bazaar or hawking 
it from house to house in within the village. Daughters help 
with these tasks, while younger sons help carry fishing gear and 
off-load the catch, and on reaching adolescence join the father's 
fishing team. 
There is only one person in Delipara who has a regular occupation 
outside of fishing - a female school teacher. Nine people have 
gone to the Gulf to work on fishing vessels there, and two men 
have gone to college but are now unemployed in the village 
because they cannot find suitable work. 
Family Ties Between Different Households 
At least two-fifths of the village are inter-related. Marriage 
partners are chosen from within the village or from one of the 
other Hindu coastal fishing communities. Bigamy is practised 
although not common. Where it occurs, the second wife is 
considerably younger than the first. There is cooperation 
between the wives in cooking and raising children. 
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Generally women marry on reaching puberty and have often been 
promised before then. Marriages are arranged between parents, 
and dowries are paid by the female's family to the male's. 
Brothers commonly live in neighbouring houses or within the same 
house. Except where there has been a family dispute, they will 
work together in the same fishing crew. The same is true but to 
a lesser extent of male cousins. 
Village Infrastructure and Facilities 
Delipara is connected to the outside world by a brick-built road 
that winds its way to the main Dhaka to Chittagong road. There 
is electricity in the settlement and prior to the 1991 cyclone 
most houses were connected to the supply. But now few families 
can afford to be reconnected. Traditionally eight ponds have 
been used for collecting water and there are 107 water-logged 
holes serving as latrines. Since the 1991 cyclone, 24 communal 
tube-wells and 16 new double-latrines have been built by outside 
agencies. Sixteen of the tube-wells are well-used and 
maintained, and people are happy to give a site on their land to 
have one constructed, although sometimes these then come to be 
seen as household property and conflicts can arise between 
community members over access. The latrines are less successful: 
they are seldom used and nobody wants to give land for their 
construction. Several were destroyed i~ the 1993 tidal surge and 
there is little interest in rebuilding them. 
There is a mandir which serves as a temple and focal point for 
community activities. There is a hut which serves as a youth 
centre and CODEC, a local NGO, has a building for its community 
organising and education activities. CODEC organises functional 
and basic literacy programmes for adults and children. The 
nearest high school is 200 yards north of the settlement and for 
health care people use the government clinic at Kumira. 
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The beach acts as the land-base for fishing activities. Slightly 
inland, beside the former breakers' yard, five large fish traders 
from outside of Delipara have bamboo storage facilities with ice 
boxes inside. These are used during the hilsa season. There are 
no special facilities on the beach itself, although early in the 
hilsa season carpenters set up boat repair facilities here and 
the beach is always lined with old hulls and drying gears. 
The sea itself is also divided into lots and families have 
specific fishing grounds where they can place their far - fishing 
grounds where nets and poles for catching hilsa. For these 
purposes the sea is divided into northern, middle and southern 
sections. Each far is allocated to a fishing boat or fishing 
household, and those far that are not too deep are the most 
valued because the fish catch decreases as the sea becomes 
deeper. 
Villagers say that the right to fish these particular waters was 
given during the colonial period, and claim that there was a 
large copper plate in which these rights were embossed. Nobody 
admits to knowing where the plate is today, but it still forms 
the basis of present claims. 
Although there are no tolls or levies for the right to a 
particular far, the villagers follow set norms and guidelines in 
allocating far, and the right to a particular far is tied to a 
family's standing in the community. Right to a far depends on 
use, and if neglected for a season it will be reallocated by the 
village elders. 
However, these rights count for nothing when the Bangladesh 
military use the area for artillery exercises. For about one 
week a year, the sea off Delipara is shelled for target practice. 
Although this is not a long period, it takes place during the 
hilsa catching season, and in 1994 coincided with the full-moon 
period which is the peaY- time for catching hilsa. 
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The community also depends on the mangrove forests that run along 
the coast. These belong to the government forestry Office, and 
people do not readily admit to taking firewood for fear of being 
accused of trespassing. 
Social Organisation 
Social Groupings 
Religion 
The entire population is Hindu from the jolodas sub-caste of 
fisherfolk and not surprisingly many of the beliefs and 
ceremonies relate to the sea. Amongst the pantheon of Hindu 
gods, the people o f Delipara give special status to Sri Krishna, 
but the sea goddess is also important. 
The community holds many beliefs and conformity with the norms 
and precedents set by their ancestors is fundamental. Belief in 
destiny, fate and the will of the gods is strong, and the 
examples of the ancestors are cited as explanations for current 
events. 
Puja are a common feature of community life and often result in a 
cessation of economic activity for two or three days. 
The Role 0f GR nder 
Occupation is demarcated by gender which also prescribes many 
social roles. Community politics is almost exclusively a male 
preserve where decision-making is initiated and finalised by men. 
However, in recent years women have been active in organising 
non-formal education and savings and loans programmes. 
Women play the predominant role in reproductive activities 
(child-rearing and domestic tasks). Men are expected to hand 
over their earnings to their wives, who many men feel are better 
money-managers. But men decide how much and when money is to be 
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handed over, and the resulting squabbles about financial 
responsibility are one reason for divorce. 
Role of Age 
Age is a significant factor in determining one's social role. 
From an early age young males assist with the fishing, helping to 
prepare the gears and off-load the catch at the end of an 
expedition. Daughters assist their mothers with domestic and 
reproductive tasks. When females reach puberty, the parents hope 
to have them married when they will take on the role of wife and 
normally mother. By the time the males are married they will be 
part of their family's fishing team, working alongside their 
father and male siblings. 
Status within the community is partly determined by age, and the 
sardar chiefs are all senior community members. Within the 
household, too, status is connected with age. 
Family 
There is a complex hierarchy amongst families within Delipara 
based on their title, their size, their wealth and their rights 
to traditional resources such as far. As the example of the 
sardari system shows, economic status is not an indicator of 
social status or influence. 
Social Activities 
Most social occasions are connected to religion and are linked in 
some way to the sardari system which plays a role in marriages 
and puja. One important festival is the Shitola Devi puja which 
in 1993 was held in May. This festival is a celebration of 
community offerings to Shitola to protect the people from 
sickness and disease. Preparation begins several days before, 
after religious representatives have gone from house to house 
seeking donations. The festival itself takes place in a 
17 
Caught In Their Own Nets 
temporary shed built across from the temple, and consists of an 
evening of singing holy songs, chants and music which carries on 
until the following morning. About 300 villagers could be seen 
gathered listening to singers, watching dancers and hearing 
readings from time-honoured texts. In one corner, people were 
preparing food offerings to the goddess (prasad) . The festival 
reaches a climax after mid-day when a communal lunch is served to 
all from dug out canoes. 
Shitola Devi puja is not the only religious festival, and others 
follow the course of the Hindu festival season. Because of their 
dependence on the sea, the festival of Sraboni Purnima and other 
offerings to the sea goddess are practised. Inhabitants may also 
make pilgrimages and some have been to Hindu holy places in 
India, travelling by land or sea. 
Apart from formal activities, the tea shops form the focus of the 
men's social life. Prior to the hilsa season there is a lot of 
talk and excitement about which people will be recruited for 
which boats. Young boys have bohoddar (boat-owners) and majhi 
(captains) as their heroes, and the way that these are spoken of 
plus the excitement generated by crew selection has been likened 
to discussions about football stars and player transfers 
elsewhere in the world. 
Inst:itut:ions 
Social Groupings 
Inter-mingled with religion is the Sardari system, a form of 
rural power structure encompassing leadership, justice and 
enforcement of social laws and practices. In Delipara there are 
five chief sardar, each with his own principal secretary (mukkho) 
chosen from among the community elders. The main sardar are 
hereditary positions, although it is possible for the sardar to 
dismiss one sardar and appoint another member of the same 
18 
Blowfield & Haque 
lineage. 
The sardar may fish themselves, and that some enter into 
contracts with boat-owners shows that this is not an economic 
elite. Equally, wealthier families in the community are not 
chief sardar. But this does not affect the respect shown to the 
sardari system for managing community affairs - its organisation 
of trials (shallish), puja, marriages and other religious and 
social festivals. 
Economic Groups 
Within the Delipara community, the family is the most important 
economic unit. In marketing, wives assist their husbands and 
daughters assist their fathers. In fishing, sons work in teams 
with their fathers or alongside their male siblings. Individuals 
without these intra-family economic relations are automatically 
disadvantaged both in terms of productive and reproductive 
activities. 
There is an important distinction to be drawn between the crew, 
the operator and the owner of a fishing boat. Men fish in a 
team, each team working on one boat. The team consists of the 
boat-owner cum operator (bohoddar) plus others, although in some 
cases the operator may lease the boat from its owner for a share 
of the catch or fixed sum. Some ceam members own their own nets 
and use the boat to place their nets. These users are called po 
unna and use the bohoddar's boat under the following conditions: 
• The bohoddar places more nets than the po unna (e.g. 
four nets compared to two), and the physical work is 
divided equally between them; 
• The bohoddar takes two-thirds of the catch, and the po 
unna divide the remainder of the catch between them; 
• The bohoddar decides where the nets are to be placed, 
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where the boat is to be directed and, indeed, whether 
to take the boat to sea at all; 
• When the bohoddar's boat is repaired, po unna may be 
called upon to pay Tk 3,000-5,000 as a contribution to 
the cost of repair. The po unna will also be obliged 
to pay a share of the cost of repairing the bohoddar's 
sister vessel which goes to sea with the mother craft. 
The bohoddar typically own 4-5 nets and had an average net income 
of Tk 40,000-50,000. Agreements with the crew may carry on for 
several years depending on the crew member's skills, his 
trustworthiness and his credit-worthiness. This latter is very 
important as the bohoddar often borrows money on behalf of crew 
members and uses this as means of control 
A more recent economic alliance has been the loans groups 
(samity) set up as a CODEC initiative. There are both men's and 
women's groups. This year, fishermen said that they were glad to 
be group members, but were sorry that the loans were inadequate 
to make ends meet outside of the hilsa season and to allow them 
to prepare for the main fishing season. 
Apart from the arrangement between boat and net-owners, there are 
economic arrangements between owners and labourers. Labourers, 
who do not have nets of their own, are paid Tk 1,000-1,400 per 
month and are contracted for up to two-thirds of the year. The 
main period for this contruct labour begins in Ashar 
(approximately June) with the hilsa season, but often carries 
through to the set bagnet season in Poush (approximately 
December), and sometimes longer. 
These labourers are mostly not Delipara inhabitants (something 
that Delipara people are proud of) and come from as far away as 
Hatia Island and Sandwip, as well as Sitakundo and Feni. While 
they are working the craft of Delipara inhabitants they are given 
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clothing, toiletries, two meals per day and Tk 10-20 per day 
pocket money in addition to their wages. However, 36 households 
in Delipara that list their main occupation as fishing do not 
have set bagnets and 30 similar households do not have tong nets. 
These people work as waged labourers on fishing boats, and the 
number of people engaging in what is regarded as a demeaning form 
of employment, has increased due to the loss of gears in the 1991 
cyclone. 
Ro1e of Government and State 
The government is currently constructing an embankment along the 
Kumira coast, although it has yet to reach Delipara. The 
community have not been consulted, and it is the cause of two 
major concerns. First is whether the embankment will reach 
Delipara and thus help the community resist the aggressive sea. 
Second is what will happen if it does reach Delipara, 
specifically what will happen to people who have to relocate 
because the embankment cuts through the settlement. 
Apart from the emergency relief given after the 1991 cyclone and 
the subsequent construction of a cyclone shelter, Delipara has 
had little contact with the formal apparatus of government. When 
there are disputes with traders, there are no local police to 
call upon , and there are no regular visits from health workers 
or fisheries' o fficers. The military camp on neighbouring ground 
once a year which is a cause of friction. 
Ro1e of NGOs 
The Chittagong-based NGO, CODEC, has a sub-office in North 
Salimpur and has been working with the Delipara community for 
This is in contrast with fisherfolk in Kumira who were 
able to call in the police to protect them from aggressive 
traders, and have benefited as a consequence. 
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almost ten years. It has helped establish a revolving fund, 
literacy classes and has provided loans to fishermen to purchase 
gears and boats. The loans programme is said to have worked well 
until the 1991 cyclone destroyed much of the equipment purchased 
and led many borrowers to default. No provision had been made to 
insure the loans. The revolving fund, which is intended to 
counter the more oppressive excesses of the traditional money-
lending system, has run fairly well for 6-8 years, but in 1994 
the late payment of loans by CODEC central office caused 
considerable frustration amongst CODEC's field-workers and the 
community. It is felt that the women's savings and loans groups 
have worked better than the men's - perhaps because women are not 
directly cauqht up in the dadondari loan system. 
Following the 1991 cyclone, aid agencies gave support to rebuild 
houses and to construct tube-wells and latrines. Although this 
was largely channelled through CODEC and met a specific need at 
the time, the sudden appearance of such resources has created an 
aid-dependency amongst the community when viewing outside 
assistance. The difference between relief and development is, 
not surprisingly, not understood, and the idea that social and 
economic changes are a gift beyond their control compounds the 
community's qenerally fatalistic attitude. 
VILLAGE ECONOMY 
Household Income and Expenditure 
Household income and expenditure is greatly affected by the 
fishing seasons. During the hilsa season the community expects a 
reasonable income, but during the set bagnet season incomes 
decline. It is during this latter period and in preparation for 
the hilsa season during Falgun and early Joishtho that loans are 
required. Repayment of these loans, either from dadondar or from 
CODEC, can consume more than half of a household's income from 
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hilsa sales. Many households find themselves unable to pay off 
their loans from a single season's hilsa catch, and loans are 
often carried over from one year to another (Table 4). 
The examples of individual household income and expenditure given 
in Table 4 show that there is only surplus income during the 
hilsa season, whereas during the set bagnet season income is only 
sufficient to meet routine household expenditures. Credit is 
used to supplement the set bagnet income, either in arrangement 
with the dadondar or directly with the kiosk-owner. Food 
obtained on credit is charged at a higher price than would 
otherwise be the case, and the loan is usually paid off during 
the hilsa season. In addition to food, household expenditures 
include clothing, medicine and the repair and maintenance of 
housing. There are also unexpected outlays such as for medical 
care. For instance, during the last hilsa season these cost one 
woman Tk 13,000 when her son had to go twice to a Chittagong 
hospital to have an intestinal disorder treated. 
There are also payments to be made in relation to social 
activities. A daughter's dowry is a major expense and must be 
planned almost from the child's birth. A dowry costs between Tk 
10,000-20,000, and in addition to money the groom's family 
receives gold (typically four grams), furniture and household 
utensils. 
Wealth Ranking 
The family of Lalmohan Das is considered to be the wealthiest in 
Delipara, but estimating relative wealth is a complicated 
process. Inevitably wealth is related to fishing. A person with 
a net has the opportunity to become a po unna and earn more money 
than someone without nets who works as a waged crew member. With 
tong nets one has the chance of obtaining a stake in a far. This 
stake can only be maintained by continued fishing, and the loss 
of one's nets, such as occurred during the 1991 cyclone, leads to 
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the loss of one's far. But with nets a fisherman can get the 
income to buy more nets and perhaps eventually a boat. By owning 
a boat, one can enter into bohoddar arrangements with net-owners 
and this entitles the fisherman to a share of the po unna's catch 
as well as to distribute loans from the dadondar. It may also 
provide enough capital to enter into business as a paikar 
(trader). 
However, this gradual rise in economic status depends also on the 
functioning of the family as an economic unit. Without sons or 
brothers to work with in a fishing team, the opportunities for 
expansion are limited. Likewise without a wife or other 
relatives to market the catch when required and to help prepare 
for fishing expeditions, there is less chance that the fishing 
enterprise will prosper. 
Control over Economic Resources 
The scarcest resource is land and as the population has grown the 
settlement has become highly congested. There have been various 
attempts to buy land from the neighbouring farming community, but 
the offers were refused, ignored or responded to with 
artificially inflated prices. The land-owners themselves say 
that the cultural, religious and economic practices of the 
Delipara community make it undesirable that the two communities 
should inter-mingle. This is ironic given that the farming 
community depends on the fisherfolk for fresh fish, and many have 
grown wealthy thanks to trade-relations. Also, given community 
accounts of past inter-relations with the farming communities, 
the ill-feeling seems to be a recent development. It may be 
exacerbated by the Muslim-Hindu conflict in India which is felt 
acutely by the Bangladesh Muslim majority. But it may also be 
exceptionally unfortunate in Delipara, and a similar community 
nearby does not seem to have quite such severe problems with its 
farming neighbours. 
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Because of difficulty in accessing land, the community are 
dependent on the sea. As mentioned earlier, the Kumira Hindu 
community says it has a claim to the marine resource dating back 
to colonial times, and based on this the Delipara sardar allocate 
sections of the sea to different fishermen. 
Before somebody can obtain a far they must have nets to utilise 
the location. For hilsa and all types of fishing, ownership of 
nets is a key to one's status as a fisherman. Seventy eight per 
cent of households in Delipara have set bagnets and 81% have tong 
nets. But as Table 5 shows, only 66% have more than one set 
bagnet and 22% have more than five. Slightly more have tong 
nets, but again only the minority have a large number of such 
nets. 
Distribution of net ownership is not equal. While on average 
each household has over four tong nets and three set bagnets, the 
range of nets owned by a household is 0-24 and 0-14 respectively 
(Table 5). Female households have a lower average number of nets 
(three tong nets, two set bagnets), and roughly one-third of such 
households do not have any nets. 
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Net ownership is just one step on the ladder of economic 
prosperity. Ownership of a boat in addition to nets means that 
the fishing household raises a person to the status of bohoddar. 
Just under half of the households in the community own boats 
(Table 5), although only 13% have more than one craft. Motorised 
vessels allow the fishing teams to travel further and faster, 
allowing better access to fishing grounds. Thirty six per cent 
of households have motorised craft; three per cent have more than 
one such craft. It should be noted, however, that these craft 
are not the large Danish-style vessels that set their gill nets 
off Chittagong. The Delipara craft are given in the Technology 
section of this chapter. 
The income that can be acquired from fishing and bohoddar 
arrangements allows some male-headed households to enter into the 
fish trade, and puts them high in the chain of economic inter-
relations described in paragraph. 
There are communal resources such as ponds used for bathing and 
sometimes drinking water. The largest and cleanest pond is 
privately owned but is nonetheless used by the community. 
Increasingly tubewells are used for water. These have been 
established by NGOs on the site of individual households. They 
are intended to be a communal resource, although in some cases 
they are regarded by the household as a private resource. 
As noted previously, the community depends on government-owned 
land for its firewood and has no legal right to the mangrove 
resource which is being developed as a storm and erosion 
prevention measure. 
Economic Activities 
Economic activities are divided between productive (i.e. those 
that directly generate income) and reproductive (i.e. those that 
ensure the continuation of the family). 
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Productive Economic Activities 
Fishing 
The Hilsa Season 
As is clear from the information presented so far, fishing is the 
main economic activity in Delipara, accounting for almost all 
income and employing or funding the subsistence of most of the 
population. The hilsa season is the most economically 
remunerative period, although for reasons o f debt it is also the 
period when there is most expenditure. This season lasts for 
approximately four months - Ashar, Sraban, Bhadra and Aswin 
(roughly June until the end o f September). 
Each month during the season there are two jo, the peak fishing 
period lasting for three days during which the majority of fish 
are caught. These coincide with the period of the new and full 
moon, from the second day (dittiya) until the fifth (panchami). 
Although the catch is higher during these peak times, the selling 
price is lower. However, the volume more than offsets the 
decrease in wholesale price and the problem fisherfolk face in 
relation t o increasing their income (and consequently to reduce 
their indebtedness) relates both to the need to add value to the 
catch and i ncrease its volume. 
Hilsa is sold by the basket (kati ) , each averaging 35-40 pieces 
of fish. The baskets are sorted by the size of fish and one kati 
fetches between Tk 150-200 depending on size and the wholesale 
price that day, approximately 30-50% of the retail market price. 
During the jo period fishing craft with six nets can catch Tk 
4,000-5,000 worth of fish per day. At other times the daily 
catch is more likely to be in the region of Tk 1,500-2,000. Not 
all teams start at the same time. At the start of the 1993 hilsa 
season in mid-AuQust onlv five larae and eleven medium motorised 
craEt plus eight unmotorised boats were at sea. 
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Over a season, a boat with six nets sells between Tk 50,000-
60,000 of hilsa or between Tk 8,300-10,000 per net. Individual 
team members earn between Tk 8,000-12,000. If all nets are used 
throughout the season (which is not the case), the maximum income 
to the community is between Tk 6.4-7.7 million.' It is more 
likely that the total is more in the region of Tk 4-5 million 
allowing for unitilised nets, boats under repair and ill health 
of crew members. 
From the hilsa income must be deducted the cost of maintaining 
boats and nets. The former cost is shared between the team 
members, the latter by individual net-owners. For an unmotorised 
boat the cost of all maintenance is between Tk 8,000-12,000 per 
season. 
Set Bagnet Season 
The set bagnet season which follows the hilsa season begins in 
Kartik (approximately late September) and continues until the 
Falgun (mid-February) . This is increasingly a lean period when 
there are few commercially valuable fish to be caught. The set 
bagnet catch is divided between that for subsistence and that for 
sale in local markets or by hawkers. The dadondar and other 
large buyers have no interest in the value or quantity of the 
catch at this time. Fish which are not for the fishing 
household's own consumption are bought by male traders (paikar) 
from Delipora or Feni for ~ale in local markets, or by women 
traders who buy smaller mixed quantities to hawk in nearby 
villaaes or sell by the basket at roadside markets. 
During this time househ ld . 0 earnlngs are rarely more than Tk SO 
per day, and for some fisherfolk a 1 
re as ow as Tk 30. 
772 nets x 
average worth of catch per net. 
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PUSH NETS 
Set bagnets are used less from Falgun until the start of Joishtho 
(mid-February until mid-April). This is the leanest period of 
the year when most fishing is done with push nets, and there is 
the greatest demand for loans. During Boishak and Joishtho the 
nets and boats are prepared for the hilsa season, but from 
Joishtho until Ashar push nets are also used to catch small Latia 
fish. 
Non- fjshinn Economic Activities 
There are almost no non-fishing economic activities in Delipara. 
Fish trading is the second primary occupation after fishing and 
has been described elsewhere. One Delipara inhabitant is a 
school teacher, nine men have gone to work in the Gulf states and 
two young men have received higher education. Although the 
community is adjacent to farming settlements, none of the 
inhabitants work as farm labourers, partly because of reasons of 
caste and partly becquse of the uneasy relations between the 
fishing and farming communities. 
~~~~~~~va ~~~v~~~AA 
Women are almost entirely responsible for reproductive activities 
withln the househoid. Men are expected to nand over their 
earningB to their wives although this does not always happen. 
Apart from when women help with preparations for a fishing 
expedition, there is a clear gender differentiation between the 
spheres of women and men. 
TECHNOLOGY 
Fishina 
The boats are owned by community 
are small, 1.5 metres Wide and 8 members. Most traditional craft 
metres long. These cost Tk 
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45,000-50,000 and there are 25-30 of these boats in Delipara. 
There are also about 22 medium sized boats (1.75 x 9.5 metres} 
which cost Tk 60,000-65,000. And there are 6-7 large sized boats 
measuring 2 x 12 metres and costing Tk 80,000. 
Prior to the 1991 cyclone there were a very few larger mechanised 
boats, but these were lost. Now there are six tempo powered by 
6, 8 or 10 h.p. engines. These are the only craft that do not 
have to worry about tidal currents. 
In addition during the peak hilsa season (Sabru-Aswin)22-33 h.p . 
boats are rented from local landowners at TY. 1,000 per day (Tk 
30,000 per month). These are not used for fishing but as 
collection vessels so that fish can be more quickly transported 
ashore when there is a large catch. 
Tong nets are used for hilsa, although poorer fisherfolk use set 
bagnets at this time. The nets are attached to poles, and 
approximately six nets constitute one far. 
similar to those described in the chapter 
are also used off the beach to catch fry. 
Post-harvest Fisheries 
The set bagnets are 
on Rehania. Push nets 
The fish is carried from the boats in the baskets in which it has 
been stored while at sea, and is then divided amongst the 
purchasers. Little is done to process the catch. In relation to 
hilsa this is largely due to the fact that the catch is promised 
to the dadondar. Dadondar employees collect the fish from the 
boats and keep it in ice boxes near the settlement until trucks 
come to take it to market or the dadondar's store. 
Hilsa spoilt by the use of set bagnets or caught when there is a 
glut are rejected by the dadondar, and are bought by paikar. 
Q~me ~~ ~h&Q& ~~QdC~Q hQ-0 OffiQll temporary ShelterS along the 
beach where the fish are gutted and the fins removed before being 
slit and preserved with salt. The fish are then laid out in 
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metal trays, covered in salt and shipped to the markets of 
Sylhet, Dhaka, Noakhali and Chittagong. There are no Delipara 
people who have taken up this activity, perhaps because it is 
only done during the hilsa season when the Delipara fisherfolk 
are busy fishing and perhaps feel there is less immediate 
financial need. 
Women dry that part of the catch which cannot be sold and is not 
for immediate subsistence, especially in the set bagnet season. 
This is stored and used when no fresh fish is available, and can 
be kept for three or four months. 
During the set bagnet season problems in reaching the nets due to 
bad weather means that up to 40% of the catch is spoilt. This 
cannot be sold and is not utilised. Thus, although at good times 
the set bagnet catch can be up to 300 kg, only 120 kg of this can 
be marketed or consumed, and during times when the catch is small 
the utilisable proportion can be as low as eight kilogrammes. 
MARKETING AND CREDIT 
Marketing 
In terms of value and quantity of fish, Delipara fisherfolk are 
heavily dependent on outside marketing channels. Although fish 
trading is important to individual households and especially the 
female-headed household section of the community, overall the 
community takes little part in the processing or marketing of 
fish. The hilsa catch is almost totally monopolised by dadondar 
- large-scale traders cum money-lenders that link into the 
extensive aratdar trading network operating throughout 
Bangladesh. 4 During that time external paikar (fish traders) 
The aratdar system is described in Bennett, 1991. To 
obtain a perspective of the size of this fish-trading network, it 
(continued ... ) 
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also come to Delipara to buy higher value fish and any hilsa that 
has not already been committed to the dadondar under a loan 
arrangement. 
The largest dadondar operating in Delipara have sheds with ice 
boxes on the edge of the village to store hilsa until they have 
enough to load a truck. Here the fish are cleaned and the 
dadondar's agents wait until the next catch is brought ashore. 
At the edge of the beach the paikar also wait. Two paikar have 
found a market for damaged hilsa and salt and store this, but 
most of the catch is sent fresh to urban markets. 
When a fishing boat arrives, there is a scurry of activity, but 
this has little to do with eagerness to bid for the fish. Most 
of the hilsa are already promised under dadondar loan agreements, 
and the dadondar agents are only concerned that paikar do not get 
to the boats first and try to buy the promised fish for a higher 
price. Only the minority of fishermen who have not taken out 
loans from dadondar are free to sell their hilsa as they want. 
For the rest, the activity around the boats is to do with 
counting the fish and setting the value off against outstanding 
loans. As the Delipara fisherfolk are almost entirely illiterate 
and in any case must ultimately accept whatever price the 
dadondar offers, this is a one-sided series of transactions. 
Furthermore, it is not the individual fisherman who decides where 
to sell the fish, but the bohoddar who then divides out the 
income as described previously. 
Once the fish have been sold to traders, the fishing crews have 
nothing more to do with the catch. Many of the women buy fish 
rejected by the traders and take this for sale locally. This is 
paid for once the fish has been sold. Wives and other relatives 
( ... continued) 
is worth noting that the largest donor of funds to the ruling 
political party is reputedly an aratdar. 
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are also called upon to help market the catch if the traders' 
price is too low (see below). 
There are also some Delipara paikar who make up most of the male 
fish traders in the settlement. These and other local paikar are 
present throughout the year, but are most prominent during the 
set bagnet season when the outside traders find no profit in 
coming to the settlement. As with the outside paikar they 
normally buy on credit, but if the fishing team leader is in need 
of cash they will pay at the landing site, although usually for a 
reduced price. In such cases the fishermen may refuse t o sell, 
preferring to give the catch to their wives to market or to 
another family member who will take it to sell. The paikar sell 
to smaller traders in loca l markets such as Feni. In contrast 
with the dadondar, they lack the capital to enter into extended 
and restrictive credit relations. 
Credit 
The ezisting credit relations are the biggest obstacle to any 
community development in Delipara. Credit is required in order 
to meet subsistence needs during the set bagnet season and 
especially the period after that when there are few fish, a need 
for money to repair gears, and no other income generating 
opportunities. 
The main source of credit is through the dadondari system. There 
are five dadondar who operate i n Delipara, each with 4-5 agents. 
The dadondar or his agents make loans during the leanest fishing 
months, either in cash or by facilitating credit at local shops 
and kiosks. As many of these money-lenders come from the 
neighbouring farm communities, this is a relatively accessible 
form of credit, although it should be noted that local money-
lenders are only the tail end of a chain, and are themselves 
linked through their own loans of working capital into a much 
broader network. 
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Not everyone in the community can access these loans. Loans are 
made to bohoddar who then distributes them amongst their crews 
who are then responsible for repayment to the bohoddar. This 
accounts for the high levels of indebtedness seen in Table 4 and 
the restrictive nature of the bohoddar-po unna arrangement. It 
also means that those not attached to a fishing crew are less 
able to access loans. Women and other household members not 
engaged in fishing must persuade the household head to borrow 
money for reproductive needs or, in pressing circumstances, go 
directly to the bohoddar themselves. Female household heads are 
clearly disadvantaged, especially if they do not have male 
children engaged in fishing. 
As money-lenders, the dadondar set the rate of interest. This 
varies between 40-60% depending on the previous credit record of 
the borrower. As normally the only numerate person involved in 
the transaction, the dadondar also fulfils the role of book-
keeper. As traders, they also set the landing price for hilsa 
which is commonly Tk 5 per kilogram less than the local wholesale 
market price; 50% less than the retail price. And as cashiers, 
the dadondar also decide when payment is to be made for the fish, 
and this takes place at the end o f the hilsa season after a final 
reckoning of credit and debt has been done. 
But the most restrictive part of the dadondari system is that it 
is brought into play no matter what the size of loan. Thus, a 
fisherman who requires a loan of Tk 1,000 and one requiring a 
loan of Tk 10,000 must both hand over exclusive rights to their 
entire season's catch to the dadondar. This is one reason behind 
some boat-owners' frustration with the CODEC credit initiative 
where delays in releasing loans have resulted in fishermen being 
drawn once more into the dadondari system, even when the amount 
of monoy roquirod w~s quito small. 
Desire to escape from the dadondari system was a prime motivation 
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for the community to support the CODEC initiative. There have 
also been more spontaneous actions such as the refusal to repay 
loans or the sale of hilsa to better-paying paikar. But while 
the dadondar cannot stop every violation of the agreement, 
prolonged resistance leads to direct conflict, with the 
dadondar's agents seizing the catch or physically assaulting the 
debtor, and in rare but famous incidents the burning down of two 
debtors' homes and the killing of a man who refused to repay a 
loan. 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Delipara is a fishing-dependent communi t y whose economic and 
social prosperity is restricted by three main factors: 
• The impact of the storms and erosion; 
• The diminishing value and quantity of the set bagnet 
catch; 
• Restrictive marketing and credit relations that prevent 
maximum benefit being gained from the hilsa catch. 
Mangroves 
There is little that can be done to overcome the first problem. 
The government has initiated a mangrove-planting programme which 
this seems to be developing successfully and will help reduce the 
impact of coastal storms, tidal surges and erosion. The 
community appreciate these potential benefits, but the mangroves 
are also the cheapest and most readily available source of 
firewood. Therefore the people are torn between longer-term 
benefits and day-to-day need. 
The actual damage caused to the mangroves is unknown. But 
assuming that prolonged exploitation will cause damage the only 
solution is to increase access to other sources of firewood, 
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either by providing direct access or through increasing incomes. 
Set Bagnets 
The set bagnet catch is in decline, forcing people to resort to 
smaller and smaller meshed nets which in turn pose a potential 
risk to the sustainability of the marine resource due to the loss 
of fingerlings. Legislation to outlaw set bagnets will simply 
make the people unwilling criminals as there are no obvious 
alternative income generating activities at the present time. 
There are some opportunities to increase the value of the catch 
which at present is subject to minimal processing and knowledge 
of salting and drying is low. However, the volume of fish with a 
market value is low. Such fish as pomfret can be easily sold and 
the women especially are active in marketing when they have the 
opportunity. More fundamental is the fact that catch-volume lS 
low and contains a high proportion of fish that cannot be 
marketed. This is not to argue that all fish should be marketed 
as this would be disastrous for the community's subsistence. 
However, as during the set bagnet season the catch is not 
obligated to third parties, any increase in fish processing 
knowledge would not prevent the fishing households from 
continuing to decide how the catch is to be utilised. 
There is also an opportunity to increase the volume of the catch 
if the problem of spoilt fish (as high as 40% of the catch) is 
addressed. Spoilage occurs in the nets at sea, especially when 
bad weather prevents fishing boats bringing in the catch. Larger 
craft would reduce this problem, but this is not presently an 
option for most fishing households. There are indications that 
credit arrangements enabling people to buy larger or motorised 
craft can be successful, although the 1991 cyclone put an end to 
the only initiative of this type to date. 
37 
Caught In Their Own Nets 
Gender 
The opportunities and constraints facing men and women in the 
Delipara community are quite different. Although being female is 
not an indicator of poverty, it is an indicator of economic 
vulnerability (e.g. female headed households) and low social 
influence. However, the CODEC credit and education interventions 
show that it is possible for women to organise themselves within 
the community, and interventions that take into account from the 
outset the gendered nature of women in society are not less 
likely to succeed than gender non-specific activities. 
Credit and Marketing 
Delipara people are capab l e o f marketing fish l ocally and are 
linked in to a wider marketing network during the hilsa season. 
Promotion of marketing activities would especially benefit women 
who are already marketing fish, and in many female-headed 
households list fish trading as their primary occupation. 
However, women trade on a smaller scale than most men, some of 
whom have achieved paikar or medium-scale trader status. 
Therefore, any intervention to assist with marketing would need 
to distinguish between the differing scales of activit y , and 
between the different opportunities and constraints that exist 
for men and women, with d special recognition of the specific 
condition of female-headed households. 
Although traders from Delipara are present at the landings 
throughout the year, they account for a small percentage of the 
total annual catch value. This is because the hilsa catch, which 
is far and away the highest value catch (accounting for not less 
than 75% of the total income from fishing), is monopolised by 
external traders, both larger paikar and the traders cum money-
lenders called dadondar. 
It is the dadondari system which is both the motor and the burden 
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of the present economic system. It provides access to the most 
readily available source of credit and the widest marketing 
channels. Yet by locking fisherfolk into a monopolistic buying 
system, it makes irrelevant any attempts to improve the value or 
quantity of the hilsa catch. Moreover, it has ramifications for 
any other initiative. For instance, assistance in savings and 
loans activities must take into consideration the fact that it 
does not matter how much a person borrows from the dadondar, the 
fact of taking a loan ties that person into handing over all the 
hilsa catch for the entire season or thereon after until the loan 
is repaid. 
This has been the greatest barrier to the CODEC samity where, 
despite the community having a good savings record, loans have 
not been made available at the required time, forcing inhabitants 
to resort once again to the dadondar. 
It should also be noted that the dadondari system revolves around 
the internal economic grouping centred on boat owners or 
bohoddar. Interventions in the credit field therefore need to 
distinguish between the position of the bohoddar, the po unna 
(net-owners), other fishermen, and those dependent on fishermen 
as relatives and/or heads of household. 
Without addressing t he credit issue, other interventions all run 
the risk of failure as it is access to loans that is the single 
greatest determining factor affecting life in Delipara. By 
reducing dependence on dadondar , people will be freer to make 
choices and control their own lives. They would be in a better 
position to take advantage of marketing opportunities, to reduce 
pressure on the marine resource and to engage in new pre and 
post-harvest fisheries practices. It is our opinion that without 
We do not suggest that the system will be replaced 
entirely. 
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addressing this issue, o ther activities c annot meet the criteria 
of sustainability. 
SECTION 3: REHANIA 
THE COMMUNITY 
Location 
Rehania is a fishing settlement within Rahmat Bazar village, part 
of Burirchar Union in Hatia Island thana off the south coast of 
Bangladesh (Map 1). It is located on the south eastern coast of 
the island, several hours from the main town of Hatia Thana Sadar 
and a fifteen minute walk from the small harbour and market of 
Rahmat Bazar. 
The settlement has been built on either side of a coastal 
embankment on government land. In some places the houses are 
almost entirely hidden from the road, perhaps reflecting the 
inhabitants' desire not to draw attention to themselves as they 
are deemed squatters. Inland are padi fields, and between the 
settlement and the sea is a large area of common land used for 
cattle grazing and unused ponds, the result of excavations to 
build the embankment. 
History 
Even by Hatia standards the people of Rehania are newcomers, the 
first settlers arriving 30 years ago. Most came to Rehania from 
the north of Hatia Island where erosion from the sea is a major 
problem. Some for instance came from Horni and were relatively 
prosperous farmers until erosion took their land. There are also 
migrants from Sandwip island to the east, working as farmers or 
traders. Some in the community traditionally engaged in fishing, 
and it is only the suitability of their present location that has 
led others to taking up what in the past they would have 
considered a low status occupation. 
All the inhabitants are Muslim. The older inhabitants remember 
that even until five years ago there was a sizeable fish catch, 
but have noticed that since 1991 it has decreased annually, with 
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1994 being the lowest to date. 
Many fisherfolk lost their belongings and houses in the cyclone 
of April 1991. Over twenty families also lost their set bagnets 
and have since had to seeY. work as waged members of fishing teams 
or, during the fishing off-season from Push-Falgun, as harvest 
labourers for local farmers. There are some sharecroppers, 
although this is considered a poorer choice than fishing. Some 
also pull rickshaws and operate cycle carts during Magh, Falgon 
and Choitro. 
ENVIRONMENT 
Weather 
The weather is as central to survival and prosperity as the sea 
whose erosion of the shoreline elsewhere has brought them to this 
place. Between the months of Joishtho/Ashar and Sraban/Bhadra 
there are rains. Heavy rain means that the small fishing craft 
cannot go to sea and this can disrupt fishing for a week at a 
time, especially during the hilsa season. Sickness is also very 
common at this time, although whether it is a result of the 
weather or a consequence of lack of money to buy medicines when 
fishing activity is forced to stop is unclear. 
The months of Agrahan/Poush until Choitro/Boishak are usually the 
dry season when the sea is calmer and there is less chance of 
storms or tidal surges.· But it is also this period that is 
poorest for fishing. 
However, the 1970 cyclone occurred during this period. 
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COMMUNITY SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
Demography 
A surprisingly large number of household heads are young (56% 
aged 35 or under), reflecting the fact that those who have 
migrated to Rehania are younger members of the family. 
Occupation 
The majority of men and a few women are engaged in fishing, as 
labourers, net-owners, bohoddar or majhi (86% of household heads 
- Table 6). As described in the chapters on Delipara and 
Rakhainpara, the bohoddar is the boat-owner who may in some cases 
operate his own boat. The majhi is the boat captain who, if he 
is not a boat owner himself, may rent the boat from the bohoddar, 
or enter an arrangement whereby the catch is shared. The majhi 
are directly involved in planning and managing the fishing 
activity. 
In addition are those involved in post-harvest fisheries. There 
are 11 fish traders (bepari) and one other smaller trader. 
There is, however, a greater variety of occupations than in the 
other two study communities. Amongst the household heads there 
are three carpenters, an agricultural labourer, a mason, two 
teachers, an imam, a mechanic, a tailor and a petty trader. Two 
household heads are retired. One female household head is the 
only head classified as unemployed, another is a small scale fish 
trader and the other three seek casual labour in the harbour and 
on boats. 
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rrable 6: Rehania Population by Gender and Age 
Total Male headed Female headed 
households % households % households % 
~otal 199 194 97°/c 5 3% 
-
~ge of HH head 
F=35 years 112 56% 111 57°/c 1 20% 
~6-50 years 63 32% 60 31°/c 3 60% 
~50 years 24 12°/c 23 12°/c 1 20% 
~arital Status of HH head 
,_,arried 194 97% 194 100% 0 Oo/c 
~on-married 5 3°/c 0 ODfc 5 1000fc 
§jngle 0 OOfc 0 QDfc 0 QDfc 
-
Table 7: Rehania Population by Occupation of HH Head 
Total Male headed Female headed 
households % households % households % 
otal 199 194 97% 5 3"A 
f)rlmary Occupation 
Fishing (incl majhi) 171 86% 168 87°1< 3 so•t. 
ish Trading 13 ?"A 12 6"A 1 20°A 
Other 12 6°1< 12 6"1< 0 o•A 
Retired 2 1% 2 1°1< 0 o•A 
UnemQioved 
-
1 
-- -
1"1< 0 1 20°/1 
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Family Ties between Households 
As Table 8 shows, there is considerable cooperation between 
relatives in economic activities. In Team 1, for instance, two 
of the crew are brothers of the majhi, in Team 12 there is one of 
the brothers of the majhi, his son and a brother-in-law, and in 
Team 4 every member is related (father, paternal uncle, cousins, 
brother-in-law and maternal uncle). 
This reflects the importance of the extended family as an 
economic unit. As the inhabitants have come to Rehania from 
various villages there are obviously new family ties being 
est~blished all the time, but it is unclear to what degree family 
ties represent ties brought from previous communities or new ties 
established while living in Rehania. 
Role of Government and NGOs 
Following the 1991 cyclone, a cyclone shelter was built in Rahmat 
Bazar, and this is now the home to a Red Crescent-funded school. 
There is a health and family planning worker, but she does not 
have a budget for medicine or contraceptives. The Red Cross 
helped with house construction after the cyclone, and a Hatia 
NGO, DUS, together with World Vision International constructed a 
model village of 22 houses. Unfortunately this is now very run 
down and has some of the poorest housing in the village. There 
is some ill-feeling amongst the people to the NGOs involved, and 
generally there is the same non-discrimination between relief and 
development work found in Delipara. 
However, it is likely that the main problem is lack of sustained 
presence by any organisation or agency. As the example of 
Rakhainpara shows, aid dependency is not an insurmountable 
problem if an organisation is prepared to invest time, build up 
trust and consult with the community. 
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VILLAGE ECONOMY 
Household Income and Expenditure 
There are fourteen majhi or boat captains who decide, out of 
their relatives, neighbours, and non residents, who is going to 
be a member of his fishing team for a particular season. The 
majhi takes the decision partly based on his asset portfolio, and 
significantly on the individual abilities and skills as well as 
asset ownership of the crew. 
The crew arrangement in a fishing team may be as follows: 
• The majhi owns or hires the boat, owns all (in the case 
of Rehania eight to ten) nets, and hires/contracts 
fisherfolk on a daily or seasonal basis to man the 
nets. The wage o f a daily fishing crew is Tk 50-60; 
while those working for a season (four to five months) 
earn Tk 6,000 to Tk 8,000. 
• The majhi owns or hires the boat, owns part of the net 
(one to seven) and hires wage labourers or contract 
fisherfolk to man his nets while taking in as many net-
owner cum operator fisherfolk as necessary to utilise 
the boat's full fishing capacity (eight to ten nets per 
boat). The net-owner cum operator may earn an average 
of Tk 10,000 to 15,000 per season. 
However, this year earnings from the set bagnet catch fell to 
less than Tk 5,000 per net in the majority of cases. Consecutive 
bad fish harvests two years in a row have led some of these 
marginal fisherfolk to reconsider their livelihood options. Some 
are considering selling their nets once and for all and seek 
employment elsewhere. 
This year, the presence of wild shrimp larvae purchasing parties 
in Chor Chenga, 18 km from Rehania, introduced a new seasonal 
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earning opportunity among community members. Wild shrimp fry, 
particularly the P. monodon species which has a high commercial 
value, is available in the estuarine environment during KartiY. up 
to Magh-Falgun, when the water salinity is high. Stocking demand 
from the shrimp farmers for fry is mostly dependent on such wild 
fry collection along the coast of Bangladesh. Prior to 1993-~994 
no one was interested buying these wild fry. In 1993-1994, 
however, word spread quickly that these larvae could be sold to 
local fry gatherers for Tk 10 - 12 per 100. On a good day, a 
person working two four-hour shifts around the high and low tide 
cycle may catch 400-500 wild larvae. The fry gatherers in turn 
carry the larvae to Char Chenga where they are counted and loaded 
on mechanised carrying boats by fry collectors arriving from 
Khulna, Bagerhat, Barisal, ~atuakhali and Cox's Bazar districts. 
The procurement price at this point is Tk 25 to Tk 30 per hundred 
live P. Monodon larvae. 
There are four majhi households who own arable land and three o f 
them crop the land engaging hired hands as they are too busy 
fishing. Three of them harvest enough rice to meet half of their 
annual subsistence rice needs, while the fourth meets his 
household rice consumption needs for the whole year. 
There are also three households who have rented land from land-
owners, and this is share-1:ropped by a tenant who gets 50% of the 
harvested crop net of all expenses. 
There are some members who during the fishing season are crew 
members, but otherwise have no regular worY.. A few have found 
work on farms, earning Tk 40 per day plus lunch and working from 
dawn to dusk. Four members are engaged in a flood control and 
drainage construction project three kilometres north along the 
embankment. They earn TY. 75 per day without food money. There 
are three community members who rent rickshaws from their owners 
and make Tk 30 to Tk 50 per day. 
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Expenditure 
A household needs cash to meet the following needs: subsistence; 
house maintenance and repair; clothing; medical care; weddings, 
religious festivals, entertaining relatives and guests, and 
children's education. 
Subsistence expenses vary according to the household's income 
level as well as family size. Daily expenditure on subsistence 
can be as little as Tk 30 per day for a small family to Tk 100 
for a large family. Thus expenditure is in the range of Tk 1,800 
to Tk 3,000 per month. 
The f o llowing des c r i bes an a nnual e :{pens e p o rtfo lio f o r a f ami ly 
of six: 
needs 
1. subsistence 
2. house maintenance and repair 
3 . clothing and footwear 
4. health and medical care 
5 . weddings* 
6. ~eligious festivals, 
7 . entertaining relatives, guests 
8 . c hildren's education 
9 . miscellaneous 
Annual Expenses 
Tk 12,000 
Tk 2,500 
Tk 1,500 
Tk 1,500 
Tk 2,000 
Tk 1,500 
Tk BOO 
Tk 1,500 
Tk 22,300 
Tidal storms and cyclones disrupt this expenditure pattern as 
whole families can lose most if not all their assets including 
their homes when such disasters strike. Post disaster situations 
therefore call for emergency funds and o ther support. 
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Wealth Ranking 
Given the importance of fisheries to Rehania, wealth can partly 
be assessed by control of fishing resources. The fishing 
community can be divided into four classes as set out below: 
set khorchi khol motorised 
Classification bag nets owned owned 
craft 
owned owned I 
large owner => 10 => 10 => 2 => 2 
medium owner => 5 => 5 1 1 
small owner => 2 => ,, L 
marginal 1 1 
--- -- -
Twelve of the fourteen majhi rent boats, the remaining two being 
owner-operators. Between them, the non-boat owning majhi own 
nineteen set bagnets with a range of 1-4. The owner-operators 
have seven and eight set bagnets respectively. 
This indicates the stages in economic progress which are similar 
to that found in Delipara. A fisherman who can buy a net is able 
to become a shareholder in a fishing te am cather than a wagea 
crew member. This ~nables the individual l:o increase his irt·..::ome 
and Gbtain capital to purchase more nets. With sufficient nets, 
the crew member has the opportunity to become a majhi and thus 
increase his earnings. Following on from this, the individual 
has the possibility of becoming a boat-owner, as an owner-
operator initially and then as an operator renting out craft. 
Control over Economic Resources 
None of the community owns land and their houses are built on 
squatted government land. There is common land that can be 
accessed for grazing and some people tentatively use the ponds 
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that have formed where excavations for the embankment were made. 
However, this is still government property and there have been no 
attempts to lease or acquire more permanent rights. 
Most majhi rent boats from the owners and there are two owner-
operators of the type commonly found in Delipara. For the set 
bagnet season rental of a traditional boat (khol) costs Tk 9,000 
for the period 15 Kartik - 15 Boishak, and for a mechanised boat, 
commonly called tempo, Tk 20,000.The fisherfolk have to pay legal 
fees and levies for fishing. The fishing tax (jol kar) during 
the set bagnet season is Tk 85 per net; per boat Tk 680 per 
season ( Tk 85 x 8 set bagnets ) . The tax for the boat has 
recently been increased from Tk 200 to Tk 600 per boat. The tax 
has t o be paid separately from that for the set bagnets and the 
chandi nets used in catching hi l sa. 
Economic Activities 
Economic activities are divided between productive (i.e. those 
that directly generate income) and reproductive (i.e. those that 
ensure the continuation of the family) . 
Productive Economic Activities 
Fishing 
Although the people of Rehania are not t raditionally fisherfolk, 
their main economic activity is now fishing due to the proximity 
of Rahmat Bazar, a small fishing port and market. Each boat has 
seven crew members and a majhi each with his own net. The catch 
is divided into eight shares, although larger craft can have ten 
members meaning there are ten nets and ten shares. In order to 
participate in this share arrangement, a fisherman must have his 
own net as is the case in Delipara but in contrast to the share 
arrangements in Rakhainpara. If the majhi or boat owner has more 
than one net, he will use hired labour to man this and these are 
paid on a retainer basis. The owner then takes his share based 
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on this hired labour , although in addition he will receive a 
rencal fee from majhi . 
The hired labour is paid Tk 1 , 000 per month plus meals , pocket 
money (Tk 5 per day) , two lungi , two c- shirts , a towel and a 
cotton shawl . 
There are 14 majhi in Rehania . They are responsible for managing 
the fishing activities o f the boat as in Rakhainpara, but in 
Rehania they also negotiate the sale of the catch , and enter into 
dadondar relations as is the case in Delipara . The composition 
of the fourteen Rehania teams and the relationship between team 
members :s found in Table 1 . 
TECMNOLOGY 
Fishing 
The most common set bagnet is 40- 45 haat (60- 70 feet ) with an 
extended opening of 45- 55 feet . The costs of a set bagnet are as 
follows : 
• net Tk 5 , 000 
• drum :.: 2 Tk 1,500 
• :rope 1 ?. =-~ 50 Et) Tk 1 , 000 
• bamboo po 1 e :·: 11 T~: 4 00 
• drum fastener x 2 Tk 400 
• poles =~ 4 Tk 250 
Total Tk 8, 550 
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MARKETING AND CREDIT 
Marketing 
The hilsa season is from mid Srabon until Aswin (August-October) . 
During this season up to eight outside dadondar come to Rahmat 
Bazar in addition to four local dadondar. The dadondar agents 
influence trading for the bulk of the catch (90-95%) as they have 
more financial resources than local traders (bepari). There are 
14 bepari, each able to purchase 40-50 fish per day. 
The sale of the catch is managed by the majhi who receives all 
payme~t from the dadondar and settlement o f loans. Payment, 
based on the market value of the f i sh, i s only made after the 
fish have been sold by the dadondar, and as the markets are o ften 
far away it is nearly impossible for the majhi to know the real 
wholesale price. 
The dadondar pay Tk 700-800 per poon (80 pieces of fish) or Tk 9-
10 per fish. This compares to the bepari price of Tk 1400 per 
poon. The dadondar agents ensure that contracted fishing boats 
hand over their catch which is then sent to carrying vessels that 
take t he fish to markets outside of Hatia such as Barisal, Dhaka, 
Narayangan j i and Madaripur. The bepari concentrate o n loca l 
markets such as Chomuhu ni, Sagaria, Oshkhali, Maijdee and Banga 
Bazar. 
From mid-Aswin or Kartik until Agrahan (October-December) is the 
shrimp season. Shrimp is sold by the basket, one basket weighing 
appro~imately 30 kg. Roughly 200 baskets (5-6 tons) are traded 
per day at this time with some 50 boats in operation. 
The shrimp are again bought by dadondar and bepari. The bepari 
pays Tk 700 per maund or Tk 18 per kilogram, and on average buys 
two maund per day (75 kg). After removing the heads, this weight 
is reduced by approximately 12 kg per maund. Dadondar pay Tk 
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400-450 per maund (Tk 11 per kg), but deal in higher volumes. 
The bepari sell the shrimp in a variety of markets such as Char 
Chenga, Choumohoni, Chittagong, Khulna and Dhaka, and have profit 
margins of about Tk 50 per maund. Selling the shrimp through 
aratdar in the larger markets costs roughly Tk 175 per kilogram, 
with coolies being paid Tk 2.5 per kg and aratdar being paid a 
commission of Tk 100 per maund. 
The set bagnet season is from the end of Agrahan until early 
Boishak (December-April). Again about 50 boats operate from 
Rahmat Bazar and the principal catch is cheuwa, each boat having 
a capacitJ of 90-120 maund. The dadondar are not evident at this 
time because cheuwa is a low value fish with a wholesale price 
when fresh of Tk 90 per maund (Tk 2.4 per kg) and a retail price 
of Tk 3.5-4 per kilogram in local markets. Between Poush and 
Magh (January) shrimp are also caught in the set bagnets, with a 
total landing for shrimp and cheuwa of Tk 350-400 maund per day. 
The shrimp catch continues until Boishak but the total volume of 
the catch declines to 250-300 maund per day. 
Local bepari purchase coughly one basket per landing, and 
approximately 100-125 maund (3-4 ton) of fresh fish are sold in a 
day for local consumption. Given the above mentioned figures for 
the ,:iail·; catch, it can be seen that there is a surplus c f fish 
during this season. Part Gf this is dried by the majhi and 80-90 
outside bepari come to Rahmat Bazar to buy this dried cheuwa. 
One maund of wet fish is equivalent to 10 kg of dried fish. 
However, there is still an over-supply of cheuwa during the set 
bagnet season. 
Cred:i.t 
The credit system between boat-owners and dadondar is similar to 
that described for Delipara. The dadondar or their agents offer 
credit to mobilise fishing e~peditions and also fishing gear. 
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Interest rates are about 150% per annum. 
The majhi may facilitate loans for the crew, and will normally 
provide advances prior to the start of the fishing season. The 
assistance provided by majhi and the amount of credit involved is 
given in Table 9. 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Rehania is an isolated spot on an already isolated island. Most 
of the product is exported because the community is poor-, and 
this in turn means that there is little economic investment which 
might improve this situation. However, some of the community 
have used the opportunities available, especially in fisheries, 
to develop trading and fishing enterprises. Although these are 
not large compared to the those of outsiders that come to the 
island during the height of the fishing seasons, they do show 
that there is potential for economic growth. 
The marketing-credit constraints seen in Delipara are not as 
severe in Rehania, although quite why the bohoddar are less 
affected by the dadondar needs further analysis. There is though 
a shortage of capital and few channels for borrowing that would 
facilitate capital investment, despite evidence that such 
opportunities would be used if available. 
Group organisation seems to be an important initiative that could 
be undertaken, and could involve savings and loans, cooperatives 
(e.g. a community general store) and even gear pools (providing a 
common resource of equipment for those without nets and other 
basic equipment). However, such interventions, which need not be 
unique to Rehania, should take into consideration the fact that 
the extended family is the major economic unit, much more so for 
Larger land-owners tend to live off the island. 
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instance than Delipara where there are traditional communicy 
institutions that are still functioning . 
In post - harvesc fisheries there is potential for increasing 
knowledge and participation in fish drying and marketing , 
especially during the set bagnet season when there is a surplus 
of supply . Gear making and repairing is another possibility as 
is boat repair , as much of the expertise to date is migrant 
labour . Ice is another area that could be looked into because to 
date there is only small ice plant on the island , and most ice is 
shipped in . 
If the land issue alongside the embankment could be resolved , 
there is also considerable potencial for salt water aquaculture . 
The land issue will not resolve itself , and could form a part o f 
a community social development programme . There may be 
opportunities for animal husbandry on the common grazing land , an 
extension of the smallstock activities the community already 
undertakes . 
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Table 8: Organisation of Rehania Fishing Teams 
NB: Relativ.es marked in bo1d 
TEAM 01 
SL NAME 
01 Altaf Hossain 
02 Bahar 
03 Nur Islam 
04 Moi.nuddi.n 
05 Sekander Hossain 
06 Abu Taher 
07 For id 
08 Anowar Hossain 
TEAM n: 
SL NAME 
01 Abdul Hai 
02 Afsar Rossal.n 
03 Khobir lJddin 
04 Mintu 
05 Nurul Hoq 
06 Foyezuddin 
07 Abul Bashar 
08 Mahe Alam 
TEAM 0 3 
SL NAME 
01 Md Robiul 
02 Sekander 
03 Dulal 
04 Mostan 
os Shahabuddin 
06 Alauddin 
07 Bashar 
08 Abul Kalam 
POSITION/TEAM ; RELATION W/MAJHI 
Majhi 
Wage Employed by Maj hi 
Wage Employed by Majhi 
Share Bolder , Brother of Majhi 
Share Holder, Brother of Majhi 
Share P.older 
Share Holder 
Share Holder 
POSITION/TEAM ; RELATION W/MAJHI 
Majhi 
Wage Employed; In-Law of Maj hi 
Wage Employed 
Wage Employed 
wage Employed 
Wage Employed 
Share Holder; Brother of MajnJ. 
Share Holder ; Paternal Cousin of Ma]hi 
POSITION/TEAM; RELATION W/MAJHI 
Majhi 
wage Employed; mat.cousin of Ma.jhi 
Wage Employed;mat .cousin of Majhi 
Wage Employed ;mat.cousin of Majhi 
Wage Employed ; mat . cousin of Ma jhi 
wage 6mployed; mat.cousin of Majhi 
Wage Employed ; relative of Majhi 
Share Holder ; brother 
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HH CODE 
01 
09 
02 
03 
HH CODE 
11 
158 
HH CODE 
13 
19 
09 Mostofa 
TEAM 1) 4 
SL NAME 
01 Abul Kashem 
02 Nur Islam 
03 Asadul Haq 
04 Hash em 
os Shohid 
06 Motalib 
07 Siddiq 
08 Md Al.i 
TEAM r· c 
SL NAME 
01 Si raj 
02 Zahid 
03 Nas ir 
04 Kamal 
os Jamal 
TEAM ll f. 
SL tfAME 
01 Bos u 
02 Khaleq 
03 Em ran 
04 Nu r I slam 
os ffe lal 
06 Nur Uddin 
07 Hashem 
08 Md Imran 
Share Holder;brother 
POSITION/TEAM RELATION W/MAJHI 
Majhi 
Blowfield & HaqUe 
22 
HH CODE 
14 
Share Holder;paternal Uncle of Majhi 
Share Holder;fathe·r of Majhi 
Share Holder .;pat. cousin of Majhi 
Share Holder;pat.cousin o.f Majhi 
Share Holder;bra.in Law(sister) 
Share Holder;bro. In Law(wife) 
Share Holder;uncle of Majhi 
POSITI ON/TEAM RELATION W/MAJHI 
Ma jhk 
Wage Employed by Majhi 
Wage Employed by Ma jhi 
Wage &mployed by Maihi 
Wage Employed by Majhi 
POSITIONI'rE.I\H REIJl.T ION W/MAJHI 
Majhi 
Wage Employed by MaJhi 
Wage Gmployed by Ma j hi 
Wage Employed by Maj hi 
Wage Employed by Ma j hi 
Wage Employed by Ma jhi 
Wage Employed ; bro ./Law (Wife) 
Wage Employed;bro./Law (Wife) 
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Do 
Do 
Do 
HH CODE 
20 
HH CODE 
25 
TEAM 0 7 
SL NAME 
01 Md Rossain 
02 Nas iruddin 
03 Oli Ahmed 
04 Sha j il Ahmed 
05 Osi Ollah 
06 Md Shahnaz 
07 Md Bulbul 
08 Shahabuddin 
TEAM t 1fl 
SL NAME 
01 Amir Hossain 
02 Baha r Uddin 
03 Shaha Raj 
04 Rashed 
os Eusup Haq 
06 Robi ul Hossain 
07 Monir 
08 Siddiq 
09 .;bul Kashem 
TEAM 0~ 
SL NAME 
0 1 A.bul f--.1lair 
02 Abdul Hai 
03 Abdur Rahim 
04 Abdul Baten 
0 5 Robiul Haq 
0 6 .!iliul Kalam 
07 Abul Hashem 
0 8 Amir Hessain 
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POSIT ION/ TEA...\1 RELATION W/~'J.AJRI 
Majhi 
Share Holder 
Shar e Holder 
Share Holder 
Share liolder 
Share Holder 
Share Holder 
Share Holder 
POSITI ON/'l'EAM RELATION W/MAJHI 
Majhi 
Share Holder 
Share Holder ; son of Baharuddin 
Shar·e Holder 
Share Holder 
Sha r e Holder 
Share Holder 
Share Ho lde r 
Share Holder 
POSITI ON/TEAM RELATION W/MAJHI 
Majh i 
Share Holder:brot her o f Maj h i 
Wage Employed by .Majhi 
Wage Employed by Majhi 
Wage Employed by Maj hi 
Wage Employed by Majhi 
Wage Employed by Ma jhi 
Wage Employed by Ma j hi 
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HH CODE 
HH CODE 
31 
27 
128 
132 
132 
139 
127 
129 
1 36 
HH CODE 
75 
79 
37 
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TEAM 10 
SL NAME POSITION/TEAM RELATION W/MAJHI HH CODE 
01 Enayet Hossain Ma jhi 84 
02 Alauddin Share Holder 
03 Shakhawat Share Holder 
04 Abul Kalam Share Holder 
05 Seraj Share Holder 
06 Serajuddin Share Holder 
07 Anowar Hossain Share Holder 73 
08 Ibrah~m Wage ~ployed by Maj hi 143 
TEAM !l 
SL NAME E>OSITI ON/T£ll..M RELATION W/MAJHI HH CODE 
01 Jonu Ma ) hi Majh i 136 
02 Shofi q Son of MaJ tu ; 136 
03 Alauddin Son of Majh~ 136 
04 Abul Kalam Son of MaJhi 136 
05 Bashar Wage Employed by Majhi 149 
06 Alauddi n Share Holder 
07 Mostan Wage ::mployed b '/ Ma j hi 184 
08 !1onl.r 'Jddl.n Share Holder 140 
09 Anowar Ho ssaul ~hare Ho lder 
TEAM 1"' 
SL NAME E>OSITI ON/TEAM RELATION W/MAJHI HH CODE 
01 Rezau t Haq Majhi 95 
02 Nurul Haq Share Holder:brother of MaJ hi 95 
03 Sel.im Share Rolder ;son of Maj hi 95 
04 Abdul Kader Share Holder :bro./Law of MaJ hi 
os Quaiyuwn wage Employed by Majhi 
06 Belal Wage Employed by Majhi 
07 Mastan Wage Employed by Majhi 
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TEAM 12 
SL NAME 
01 Reza ul Haq 
02 Nurul Baq 
03 Selim 
04 Abdu~ Kader 
os Qua iyuum 
06 a e lal 
07 Ma s t an 
TEAM 13 
SL tiAME 
01 Kashern 
02 Md Babul 
03 Robiul Hossal.n 
04 Dulal 
05 Jashim U'ddin 
06 Akhbar Hossal.n 
07 Ruhul Amin 
08 Abul Kashem 
93b Jobra Khatun 
TEAM 1. -! 
SL ~lAME 
01 Eusup 
02 Belal 
03 Abul Bashar 
04 Monir 
os Mostafa 
06 Nur I slam 
07 Jalal 
08 Riton 
09 i.<orim 
10 Bab u.l 
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POSITI ON/TEAM RELATION W/MAJHI 
Ma jhi 
Share Bolder : brother of Ma j h i 
Share Bolder:son of Majhi 
Share Holder;bro. / Law of Majhi Sagari a 
Wa ge Employed by Ma j hl. 
Wage Emplo yed by Majhi 
Wage Emplo yed by Ma j hi 
POSITio:TIT EAM RELATION W/ t1AJH I 
Majhi 
Share Holder ; Son of Ma j h i 
Share Holder ; Son of MaJhi 
Sha.re Ho l der ; broth er 
Share Holde·r ; 
Share Holder; 
Share Holder; 
Wa qe Employed 
Sha reholder 
Son of Majhi 
Nephew 
Brother i n Law 
I?OSITION/'!'E1\H REL.U..TI ON W/t1AJ1=! I 
Majhi 
Share Holder ; Brother 
Share Holder ; Brothe r 
Share Holder; Brother 
Share Holder ; Brother 
Share Hol.der ; Cous i n 
Sh are Ho lder ; 
Share Ho l der ; tleighbour 
Share Ho lder: t.feighbour 
Share Ho lder ; Neighbour 
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HH CODE 
95 
95 
95 
HH CODE 
69 
69 
68 
71 
HH CODE 
164 
162 
161 
163 
160 
170 
179 
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Table 9: Fishing Crew Credit Arrangements in Operation in Rehania 
CODE HH HEAD HOW MAJHI ASSIST SHAE RFF+WAGED HOW MUCH CREDIT REMAINING/ 
eo~ ,...,.... "'~""71.nr r-o J;" nTT 
" '"""""'liMnnJr.: "'"" .,.,. "'"" "'"" " "'1111 
11 MD ABDUL HAI SHARE FF + WAGED FF HAVE NO LAST YEAR POOR CATCH, SO TK 
CREDIT FACILITY, MAJHI PROVIDES 16,000 OUTSTANDING FROM LAST 
I TK 1,000 ADVANCE EACH TO WAGED YEARS CREDIT OF TK 60,000 I 
FF BEFORE START OF FISHING 
SEASON 
01 ALTAF HOSSAIN MAJHI RESPONSIBLE FOR TAKING LAST YEAR POOR CATCH, SO TK 3,500 
DADON TO PAY WAGED FF ADVANCE OUTSTANDING FROM LAST YEARS 
SALARY + OTHER RATIONS + CREDIT OF TK 13,000 
FRINGES 
13 MD ROBIUL 9 SHARE FF INCL MAJHI, EACH LAST YEAR TK 25,000 OUTSTANDING 
EQUALY LIABLE FOR CREDIT FOR 9 CREW 
HANDLED B"{ MAJHI 
zo GASUDDIN ALL WAGED cF ; NO CREDIT LAST YEAR TK 6,000 OUTSTANDING 
RESPONSIBILITY ON THEM, THEY 
I GET TK 1000 ADVANCE BEFORE 
SEASON, ONLY MAJHI LIABLE 
31 MD HOSSAIN 8 SHARE FF I NCL MAJHI, EACH LAST YEAR TK 26,000 OUTSTANDING 
EQUALY LIABLE FOR CREDIT FOR 8 CREW 
HANDLED BY MAJHI 
64 ENAYET B SHARE FF INCL MAJHI, EACH LAST YEAR TK 2,000 OUTSTANDING 
HOSSAIN EQUALY LIABLE FOR CREDIT 
HANDLED BY ~1AJHI 
69 KASHEM 8 SHARE FF [NCL MAJHI, NO CREDIT OUTSTANDING FROM LAST I EACH I 
EQUALY LIABLE FOR CREDIT YEAR I 
HANDLED BY t-!AJHI 
:s BOSU PAY ONE MONTH'S ADVANCE {TK LAST YEAR'S DEBT OUTSTANDING TK 
1000) T0 EACH FISHING CREW 30,000 
7~ ABUL KHAIR EIGHT SHARE FISHING CREW UNDER LAST YEAR'S DEBT OUTSTANDING TK 
MAJHI'S RESPONSIBILITY WITH 25,000 
EQUAL SHARES 
95 REZAUL HAQ EIGHT SHARE FISHING CREW UNDER LAST YEAR'S DEBT OUTSTANDING TK 
MAJHI'S RESPONSIBILITY WITH 20,000 
EQUAL SHARES 
128 AMIR HOSSAIN TEN SHARE FISHING CREW UNDER LAST YEAR'S DEBT OUTSTANDING TK 
MAJHI'S RESPONSIBILITY WITH 8,000 
- -
EOUAl S HARES 
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l36 DHONU MAJKI TEN SHARE FISHING CREW UNDER LAST YEAR'S DEBT OUTSTANDING TK I I'V'.JHI' S RESI?ONSIBILITY WTTH 23,000 I 
EQUAL SHARES 
u ABut. KASHEM ALL 8 FISHING CREW UNDER LAST YEAR'S DEBT OUTSTANDING TK 
MAJHI' S COMMAND TAKE CREDIT Al<D 2,000 
IS LIABLE JOINTLY 
164 EUNUS 1-!A.JHI FOIJR ~/AGE FISHING CR£91 AND FIVE LAST YEAR'S DEBT OUTSTANDING TK 
SHARE FISHING CREW ALL UNDER 40,000 
MAJF!I' S C:Oio!MAND 
E'F = fisherfol k 
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SECTION 4: RAKHAINPARA 
THE COMMUNITY 
Locati.on 
Rakhainpara is a settlement in Khurushkul thana, Cox's Bazar 
district, on the south-east coast of Bangladesh (Map 1). It is 
set back from the sea, in the middle of padi fields owned by 
people from nearby settlements, and cut off from Cox's Bazar bj a 
narrow estuary. However, access to the sea is possible along 
paths leading to the long shallow shoreline where outside of the 
hilsa season fish-drying takes place. 
Hi. story 
The Rakhainpara communitj is part of the larger Rakhain ethnic 
group who migrated from Burma during the first part of this 
century. The Rakhain are Buddhists and have their own language, 
few of them being able to speak Bangla. Although many Rakhain 
migrate to and from Burma, according to community elders this 
particular community has been located along the Khurushkul coast 
for the last six decades. 
Rakhainpara was ideally suited to those who had skill and 
experience in using gill nets, set bagnets and bottom longlines. 
Originally most men .)wned 1nd operated their own nets ~nd boats, 
and were able to live from the sea. The Rdkhain women brought 
with them weaving skills and installed handlooms beneath their 
houses, which are built in stilts. But many handlooms were lost 
in the 1991 cyclone, ~nd the ones found today belong to Cox's 
Bazar merchants who buy the woven cloth on a piece basis. 
Over the years, the Rakhain fishermen, once amongst the most 
skilled and knowledgable in the area, have been reduced from 
owner-operators to working as hired crew on others' boats. It is 
ironic that the Rakhain introduced many fishing skills into the 
Cox's Bazar area, but are now employees of Muslim-Bangla owners 
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who started fishing less than twenty years ago. Yet there is not 
the same ethnic ill-feeling such as is found between Muslims and 
Hindus further along the coast , and the present settlement site 
of 1.5 acres was a gift from a Muslim-Bangla zarnindar, Muzaffar 
Ahrned Chowdhury. 
THE ENVIRONMENT 
The Weather 
The weather is as central to survival and prosperity as the sea. 
The community was severely affected by the 1991 cyclone, and in 
May 1994 storms destroyed four houses·. 
Between the months of Joishtho/Ashar and Sraban/Bhadra there are 
rains. The months of Agrahan/Pcush until Choitro/Boishak are 
usually the dry season. For most of this time the sea is calmer 
and there is less climatic hazard. But the weeks at the end of 
this season are the most storm-prone and the storm of 1991 and 
1994 occurred during Boishak month just before the monsoons 
begin. 
COMMUNITY SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
The Sett~ement 
Rakhainpara is located on a small plot of land surrounded by the 
arable land of the neighbouring communities. Houses are made of 
wood and are mostly on stilts. These have proved more resilient 
to storms and also provide a work and storage area underneath. 
The sea is a few minutes' walk away, the arable land separated 
., See section on Delipara . 
HH codes 25, 62, 77, 87 
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from ~he shore by an embankment that during the set bagnet season 
is filled with fish drying operations . 
Inside the settlemen~ there is a cyclone shelter that also ac~s 
as a temple and community centre . There are two working 
tubewells , but for the most part the community does not have its 
own basic resources (water , firewood , timber) . 
Demography 
There are 94 households , thirteen o f which are female headed 
(14%) . There is a fairly equal distribution across the age 
ranges (Table 10) , although the largest group of male headed 
househo lds is 35 years o r under and f or females between 36- 50 
years . 
Occupation 
The majority of Rakhainpara inhabitants (87% of household heads) 
are engaged in fishing in one way o r another (Table 11) . This 
includes waged fish crews , longline crews , boat captains , a 
mechanic , net makers , a fish trader and a dried fish processor . 
Of these almost 79% work on fishing boats . However , only one 
person currently owns his own boats . 
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Table 10: Rakhainpara Population by Gender and Aqe 
Total Male headed Female headed 
households % households % households % 
lrotal 94 81 86o/c 13 14°/i 
~ge of HH head 
F=35 years 38 40o/c 35 43o/c 3 23% 
~6-60 years 35 37o/c 29 36°/c 6 46% 
>50 vears 21 22o/c 17 21% 4 31% 
Table 11: Rakhainpara Population by Occupation of HH Head 
Total Male headed Female headed . 
households % households % households % 
trotal 94 81 86% 13 14°/c 
Primary Occupation I 
Fish labourer 39 41°/c 33 41% 6 46% 
~ong liner 20 21 o/c 20 25% 0 0% 
1\Aajhi 14 15°1i 14 17o/c 0 0% 
Net maker 5 5°/c 5 6o/c 0 Oo/c 
bther 16 17o/c 9 11 °/c 7 54o/q 
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Looking beyond the household head the same degree of involvement 
in fisheries is evident amongst all males, but there are a large 
number of women who have independent incomes from weaving. Away 
from fishing, there is a broader range of occupations than in 
Delipara - small shops, petty traders and tailors. But 
opportunities in such fields are limited and depend on access to 
capital. This is especially problematic for non-married women 
who cannot enter into fishing and for whom weaving does not 
provide an adequate income to meet the household's needs. 
Amongst such women there is likely to be a greater diversity of 
employment activities including sewing, selling and weaving. 
Social Organisation 
Religion 
The people of Rakhainpara are Buddhists, although the surrounding 
communities are Muslim. The cyclone shelter serves also as a 
Buddhist temple and community centre, and there is an elderly 
monk living there. In the past, the monk was the senior village 
elder, but while he is not without influence today, younger 
household heads have succeeded in moving community decision-
making into a more secular domain. 
Gender 
Wome n are e~cluded from t he main economic activity, f~shing, ~nd 
do not play much part in fishing-related activities such as 
trading, largely because the men themsel ves are not greatly 
involved in post-harvest fisheries. They are involved in weaving 
and a variety of other economic activities, but as the cases of 
households where women are the main income earners show, this is 
not as lucrative as fishing even if it does provide an important, 
and non-male controlled, source of income in male-headed 
households. 
Women take most o f the responsibility for reproductive 
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activities. If a woman divorces or is otherwise left without a 
husband, she is by custom responsible for the children. Women 
may also be responsible for elderly parents. 
Most widows and female divorcees, unlike their male counterparts, 
do not remarry. Thus, with the responsibility for both their 
children's and parents' subsistence, their economic burden is 
considerably greater than men in a similar position. 
Nonetheless, the early indications from the AZAD savings 
initiative suggest that women are able to organise effectively 
when given the support and motivation. 
Social Activities 
Economic Groups 
The family is not as significant an economic group as it is in 
Delipara. This is primarily because such a large proportion of 
the community is engaged as contracted or waged labour. The 
local NGO, AZAD, has recently organised three savings groups 
(samity) in the community, two for women and one for men. The 
male samity has fifteen members, while the female ones have 24 
and 20 members respectively. It is noticeable in the male samity 
that the members are all under 33 years old. All are labourers 
on fishing craft. 
At the beginning of 1993 there were two bohoddar ( fishing boat-
owners), each with regular captains and crews. One of these 
ceased to operate during 1993, but the other still has two 
captains (majhi) and fourteen crew members (see case study, Annex 
3). These form an economic production unit similar to those 
found in Delipara. The bohoddar employs the majhi and crew under 
a form of share arrangement. A majhi receives Tk 40 for every Tk 
1,000 of the catch while crew members receive Tk 20 per Tk 1,000. 
This payment is made after the bohoddar has been paid for the 
catch and after all outstanding expenses have been deducted from 
68 
Blowfield & Haque 
the proceeds. The bohoddar gives advances prior to the start of 
the fishing season. In the case of the majhi this was Tk 4,000 
in 1993, and for crew members Tk 2,000. 
In order to meet the costs of crew and maintenance, the bohoddar 
depends on access to credit. Although the dadondari system 
prevalent in Delipara is found too in Cox's Bazar, there are also 
normal money-lenders and the bohoddar prefer to approach these, 
paying interest at roughly 6% per month. 
Women weavers are indentured to merchants that provide raw 
materials, but this does not give them access to additional 
credit and if they had ~nough capital to buy thread and repair 
their handlooms it is possible that they would be able to rever~ 
to the independent production system which existed before the 
1991 cyclone. 
Role of Government and State 
following the 1991 cyclone, a cyclone shelter was built on 
community land. 
Role of NGOs 
AZAD is a small NGO working with Rakhainpara and other 
settlements of Khurushkul. It was P.s-r.ablished with the help or 
leading members of Cox's Bazar society, and its day-to-day 
affairs are managed by two local inhabitants who have sold part 
of their assets to fund activities. AZAD has established a 
school in the area and has an office less than half an hour's 
walk from Rakhainpara. It has yet to receive any donor support, 
but with locally-raised funds and community participation has 
succeeded in starting a variety of activities including non-
formal education and savings and loans. As part of the latter, 
AZAD has helped set up three samity in Rakhainpara. 
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VILLAGE ECONOMY 
Wealth Ranking 
There is also one household head who has a fish drying operation, 
and although earnings fluctuate from month to month the capital 
required to run such operations make this person wealthier than 
most others in the community 
Control over Economic Resources 
Those engaged in fish drying do not require land as the 
operations take place on temporary lots along the coast. 
However, they must invest each year in bamboo racks, mats, 
shelters and hooks in addition to non-capital expenditures such 
as wages. 
There are 51 handlooms in operation and about six more that could 
be repaired. These are controlled by individual households. 
Prior to the 1991 cyclone there were more than 100 handlooms, but 
during the cyclone over 30 households lost their handlooms 
completely while others have been unable to repair them for want 
of money. 
One household has a cow, but the raising o f ducks and chickens is 
popular. Households have their own houses which are constructed 
of wood and elevated on stilts. Beneath the house is used for 
storage and weaving. Attempts to introduce other types of 
housing have not been successful, and in the May 1994 storm it 
was the non-elevated housing that was destroyed. 
Economic Activities 
Economic activities are divided between productive (i.e. those 
that directly generate income) and reproductive (i.e. those that 
ensure the continuation of the family). 
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Productive Economic Activities 
Fishing 
The main income generating activity for men is fishing. Most men 
are waged fishermen, primarily engaged in hilsa fishing and 
longlining, and rarely have the economic resources to organise 
their own operations. However, there are also fourteen majhi and 
one active bohoddar. 
The fishermen's year is divided between the hilsa season, the set 
bagnet season and the longline season. For the hilsa season the 
fishermen are contracted to one of the large mechanised boats 
operating from Cox's Bazar. During this time they are only in 
the settlement during the slack periods of the month;'. A 
separate contract is arranged for the set bagnet season while 
those engaged in longlining begin about half way through the set 
bagnet season. For an ezperienced fisherman who is contracted 
during both seasons, the total value of the contracts is Tk 
10,000-12,000, although new hands may receive only Tk 8,000. 
The set bagnet season begins in Aswin/Kartik and lasts until 
Magh/Falgun, but after a peak of approximately three months or 
six jo the use of larger mechanised vessels become less viable, 
and smaller craft with smaller set bagnets are used, operating 
just off the coast. 
The average catch for a set bagnet craft with six nets, landing 
twice per day, is about 262.5 kg or seven maunds: 1 , although as 
already noted for Delipara, there are weekly and monthly 
fluctuations in the catch, and during a jo period the catch may 
l iJ See Delipara section. 
:t 1 maund 37.5 kg. 
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be as high as 25 maund. These figures include fish that have 
rotted once caught which can make up 20-40% of the catch. 
Longlining follows a similar basic system to set bagnet and hilsa 
operations. The bohoddar, who owns the boat and the lines, 
recruits a majhi and a crew of about seven people. The catch is 
sold by the bohoddar and the income divided into fifteen shares. 
The bohoddar takes six shares, the majhi 1.5 shares and the 
remaining 6.5 shares are divided amongst the crew. However, in 
some cases the crew are paid a straight daily wage of Tk 60. 
The main longline catch is poa (croaker- red and white), 
although on rare occasions other large species are caught. Red 
croaker fetches Tk 5,000 per maund and white ones fetch Tk 4,000. 
These are bought by a Cox' Bazar fish processing plant. 
Longlining takes place between Bhadra/Aswin and Agrahon/Poush. 
The average weekly operational cost during this period is Tk 
10,000 and the value of the catch varies between Tk 20,000-35,000 
or Tk 110,000 per month. Thus, typical net earnings for a 
longlining boat are in the region of Tk 70,000 per month. 
There is less employment during the set bagnet season, and those 
who cannot find work o n boats seek c asual employment along the 
shoreline where the bohoddar and fish traders have fish drying 
operations. The set bagnet craft land their catch on the shore 
and, if not committed to a boat-owner, it is auctioned to the 
highest bidder, who prices it according to his estimate of 
quantity (per kati [basket]), species composition and quality. 
Only a few species such as chanda (pomfret) and poa (croaker) are 
sorted before auction. 
During this season coast near the village is lined with racks, 
mats and storage huts. In 1993, six Rakhain men had their own 
fish-drying operations with a total turnover of Tk 216,200 (Table 
12). However, the majority of fish dryers are from neighbouring 
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communities such as Rastarpara and Kauwerpara. 
Fish-dryers buy unsorted fish for approximately Tk 400-500 per 
maund and a season's revenue ranges between approximately Tk 
290,000 and Tk 400,000 per boat. 1 ~ The added value of the fish 
can be seen from the price of dried fish in Cox's Bazar where a 
kilogram of dried churi fetches Tk 2,000, faisha Tk 1,300, 
croaker (poa) Tk 1,200 and stingray Tk 800. 
There is considerable monthly fluctuation in the net income of 
fish dryers. For instance, one Rakhain dryer made Tk 5,000 on Tk 
25,000 of fish one month, but only Tk 250 on Tk 20,000 the next. 
The dryers regularly borrow money in order to purchase fish, 
especially as obtaining the best price depends on being able to 
store fish until the monsoon season when prices rise by up to 
50%. To an eztent the dryers avoid the need to borrow money by 
buying fish on a deferred payment basis from bohoddar. Where 
credit is required, it is usually borrowed from informal money-
lenders or bohoddar, but sometimes from relatives or friends. 
Some fish dryers also trade in wet fish. They may also have 
their own fishing boats and crew. 
Outside of fishing and fish trading, there are also net-makers. 
t: Based on a sample of six boats. 
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Table 12: Rakhainpara Community Members Operating Fish Drying and Marketing 
Activities using Cash Loan 
01. NAME: A 3U RI HH CODE = 78 
FISH PURCF~Z 3 DEC ?3 
CREDIT '!'K 30,000 
LABCt;R ~ ·:OTHER <::\PENSES 
DRY FISH SELL:::NG 
CHURI 
FAISHA 
PCA 
S~LSHRMP+ASSRTD 
5 MND 
10 MND 
10 MND 
5 MND 
TOT Q!ITY = 8 0 l1ND 
TOT '!AJ... @ 'I'K 10/KG 
INTEREST i @lOO,/MNTHl 
T":1T '::::ST 
'!'0T ~NTY ~ 20 MNDS 
@ TK 2000/MND ~TK 
@ 'I'K 1300/MND zTK 
@ TK 1200/MND zTK 
@ 'I'K '100/MND '"TK 
=TK 
='!'K 
=TK 
=·rK 
10,000 
13,000 
12,000 
4,500 
TOT VAL OF SALES 
TOTAL COST 
NET FlETUP.N 
02. NAME MON SEE PRU HH CODE 48 
FISH PURCHASE 5 JAN 94 TIJT QNTY = 
TOT VAL @ TK/KG ~TK 
CREDIT TK 20,000 INTEREST (@lO!j,/MNTHl =TK 
LABOUR + OTHER EXPENSES =TK 
TOI COST ~ 
DRY FISH SELLING TOT QNTY = 29 MNDS 
CHURI 4 MND @ ·rK 2000/MND zTK 8,000 
FAISHA 10 MND @ TK 1300/MND ~TK 13,000 
POA 9 MND @ TK 1200/MND '"TK 10, 800 
S~LSHRMP+ASSRTD 5 MND @ TK 900/MND 
-TK 4,500 
TOT VAL OF SALES 
TOTAL COST 
NET RETURN 
03. NAME MONG SING HH CODE 8 
FISH PURCHASE 5 JAN 94 
CREDIT TK 25,000 
LABOUR + OTHER EXPENSES 
DRY FISH SELLING 
CHURI 5 MND 
FAISHA 10 MND 
POA 10 MND 
S~LSHRMP+ASSTD 5 MND 
04. NAME SHA CHA 
FISH PURCHASE 5 JAN 94 
CREDIT TK 20,000 
LABOUR + OTHER EXPENSES 
DRY FISH SELLING 
CHURI 
FAISHA 
POA 
SMLL SHRMP+ASSRTD 
3 MND 
7 MND 
9 MND 
5 MND 
TOT QNTY = 80 MNDS 
TOT VAL@ TK/KG =TK 
INTEREST (@ 10~/MNTH) =TK 
=TK 
TOT COST 
TOT QNTY = 30 MNDS 
@ TK 2000/MND =TK 10,000 
@ TK 1300/MND zTK 13,000 
@ TK 1200/MND sTK 1:::,000 
@ TK 1000/MND =TK 5 ,000 
TOT VAL OF SALES 
TOTAL COST 
NET RETURN 
HH CODE 11 
TOT QNTY = 60 MNDS 
TOT VAL@ TK/KG =TK 
INTEREST (@10'ls/MNTH) =TK 
=TK 
TOT COST ~TK 
TOT QNTY = 23 MNDS 
@ TK 2000/MND =TK 6,000 
@ TK 1300/MND ~TK 9,100 
@ TK 1200/MND ~TK <l , -500 
@ TK 900/MND =TK 4,500 
TOT VAL OF SALES 
TOTAL COST 
NET RETTJRN 
30,000 
3,0JOO 
:,JGO 
::. . 1r)Q 
sTK 39,500 
'"TK 35,300 
=TK 4.200 
25,000 
2,000 
2,000 
~9 . QOO 
=TK 36,300 
~TK 29,000 
=TK -, 300 
28,000 
2,500 
2,200 
=TK 3::.700 
=TK 40,000 
=TK 32,700 
=TK 7 , 300 
20,000 
2,000 
1,500 
23.500 
=TK 29,200 
=TK :!3,500 
='t'IS: ___l._2QQ 
OS. ~CAME MONG ?RU 
E'I.SH ~·JRC!iASE DEC 9 3 
CRED17 7~ 20,000 
I.i\.BOUR - :OTHER £:~ ?ENSES 
DR'i !!:H SE~:.:~!G 
CHURr 
<AISHA 
?r:A ~ Sl'OU.:.. : 
SMLLSHRMP+ASSRT~ 
06. NAME KWAW CHA 
FISH PURCHASE DEC 93 
CREDIT TK 25,000 
LABOUR + OTHER EXPENSES 
DRY fiSH SEt.LDfG 
CHURl 
E'AlSHA 
I?OA ( S19.LL I 
SMLLSHRMP+ASSRTD 
HH CCCE 52 
T'Yl' QNTY = 
TOT ' !71.L@ T!</K'G =TK 25 ,000 
INTEREST (@lO•/MNTHl ~TK 2 , 000 
~TK ::! , 000 
TOT CCS'!' =TK :1<:.009 
T'JT ~NTY ,. 1 9 ~"liDS 
4 MND @ TK 2000/MND =TK e, ooo 
10 MNl) @ TK 1300/MND =TK u.ooo 
9 :-w:> @ 7~ ::-'}C/:·!ND -='!.'K 1o ,eoo 
5~ (! TK 900/MND -TK 4,000 
TOT ~ OE' SAL.ES •T'K 35 ,400 
TOTAL COST =TK 29,000 
NET RE.T'.!RN DTK ?,_A_Q_Q_ 
HH CODE 63 
TOT QNTY = 
TOT VAL@ TK/KG a'l'K 25,000 
INTEREST (@ :,fMNTHl DTK 2,500 
;TK 2,000 
T~ CCS't' <>TK : ~. SOD 
TOT QNTY = 28 MND 
4 MND @ TK 2000/ MND =TK e,ooo 
10 MNT.l @ ':K lJOO/MND ~TK 13,000 
9 MND @ TK 1200/MNO ""l'K 10, 900 
5 MNO @ Tl< 800/MND '"TK 4,000 
TOT Vl\1 OE' SALES -=TK 35,800 
TOTAL COST "''l'K 29,500 
N"ET RETURN =TK oi,JOO 
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Weaving 
The women are skilled weavers of shirting, lungi and bags, and 
use handlooms installed beneath their houses. A standard 
handloom costs Tk 8,000-10,000 to make. The vast majority depend 
on merchants to advance them thread and in return the product 
must be sold to the merchant. For cloth, the weavers receive Tk 
800 per 120 yards which takes approximately 30 days to produce. 
For bags, weavers are paid Tk 15 per bag and can make one bag per 
day. 
Other 
There is a greater diversity of income generating activities than 
in Delipara, reflecting greater integration with the surrounding 
communi t ies and the lack of an occupation-specific sub-caste. 
Given that the Rakhain have as long a history of involvement in 
fishing as the people of Delipara, it is not reasonable to 
conclude that the diversity of occupation is due to less skill or 
interest in fishing. 
Some o f these economic activities are a result of access to 
capital (e.g. shop ownership), some are connected to specific 
skills (e.g. mechanic ) , and some are a consequence of gender 
divisions of labour (e.g. women Lnvol ved in general t rading and 
sewing). 
Reproductive Activities 
Because of their involvement in weaving, women as a whole play a 
more active part in productive economic activities than those in 
Delipara. Nonetheless, as the Ma Sen Da case study shows (Annex 
3), this does not mean that they are any less responsible for 
managing reproductive activities. 
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TECHNOLOGY 
Fishing Technology 
The craft on which the Rakhainpara crews work are 22 or 33 h.p., 
30-38 foot vessels most of which operate out of Cox's Bazar. At 
the tail end of the season, traditional sampan-type craft are 
used (25-30 foot). The nets are similar to those in Rehania and 
Delipara. 
Post-harvest Technology 
During the set bagnet season fish are dried along the coast. 
This is done by placing the fish on bamboo racks, on mats and 
sometimes on the sand if there is no other place. A few of the 
Rehania people are engaged directly in this, and probably more 
have the skills to do so but lack the capital. 
MARKETING AND CREDIT 
Marketing 
Because most of the fishermen are employees of some kind and do 
not have boats or nets of their own, they have little or no say 
in how the fish is marketed. Only the fourteen who are majhi 
have some influence on how the boat and net owners sell the 
catch, and there is now only one bohoddar in the community, as 
well as one fish dryer. 
The fish is sold at auction at the landing sites, and except 
where the bohoddar has a drying operation during the set bagnet 
season, the interest of the fishermen in marketing ends there. 
There are dadondar operating in the area, and the system is 
similar to that described for Delipara. However, the dadondari 
system depends on boat-ownership, and the one boat owner in 
Rakhainpara is able to borrow money from alternative sources 
which are far more readily available in the Cox's Bazar district 
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than is the case in North Salimpur. 
Cred:it 
Individual households nonetheless require credit. Much of this 
consists of advances on earnings when a contract to work on a 
bohoddar's boat is made. These advances are made before the two 
main seasons begin and are typically for a quarter of the 
contract amount. However, the fishermen complain that the amount 
promised before the season is higher than the amount they 
eventually receive. This may reflect a lower catch than 
anticipated by the bohoddar during the 1993- 1 994 period, or a 
hidden charge for the advance. 
For those who are not engaged in fishing or those who fail to get 
employment on a boat during a season, there is no immediate 
source of credit available. As mentioned previously, weavers 
receive raw materials from their buyers, but although individuals 
may go to the merchants for loans in time of need, this is not 
the same systematised arrangement found in fishing. Shops and 
kiosks provide a source of credit for food and other basic needs, 
and there seems to be lending between households of the 
community, reportedly without interest. The degree to which 
individuals go to money-lenders to meet subsistence needs is not 
known, although Lt is l ikely t hat shop- keepers and others i n the 
village provide small loans. Recently the NGO, AZAD, has started 
three savings groups, but i t is too early to judge their success. 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In terms of skills and markets the Rakhain have considerable 
potential. They are not generally locked into the dadondari 
system that is so much a feature of Delipara fisherfolk's 
existence, and although this is largely due to the fact that as 
predominantly majhi and labourers they offer no attraction to 
dadondar, it is also the case that there is a greater variety of 
77 
Caught In Their Own Nets 
lending opportunity, even if at high rates of interest. 
But for most people, there is no access to credit for investment 
to take advantage of the opportunities in fishing, post-harvest 
fisheries and other income generating activities such as weaving. 
The majority of households depend on advances from boat-owners or 
majhi, or in the case of weavers from merchants. Because the 
community as a whole lacks assets, there is little chance that 
improvement in general economic welfare can be achieved by 
internal engines of growth (e.g. through family or social 
mechanisms). 
Indeed, in recent years the economic assets of the community have 
declined. Many handlooms were damaged or destroyed in the 1991 
cyclone and only some of these have been repaired or replaced. 
In recent years there have only been two bohoddar, and one of 
these went bankrupt in 1993. 
There is a limited but diverse range of other income generating 
activities such as net-making being conducted, and again these 
skills offer opportunity for expansion. Non-married women are 
especially likely to have diverse sources of income, although 
this is partly due to their gendered inability to enter into more 
lucrative fields, and also their need to balance productive and 
reproductive roles which tradition prescribes to women. 
In general, although opportunities exist in a variety of sectors 
including post-harvest fisheries, the critical problem is access 
to capital. The position of women would need to be given special 
consideration, but for both sexes there are clear openings such 
as weaving and fish drying, as well as in fishing. 
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SECTION 5: CONCLUSIONS 
EFFECT OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
The thinking, aspirations and perceptions of set bagnet 
communities are very much determined by the reality of their 
environment. They are highly susceptible to natural disasters 
such as cyclones, flooding and tidal surges. Loss of property, 
natural resources (e.g. through erosion) and development momentum 
that occurs because of natural disasters seriously influences 
their perceptions of the future. There is a high degree of 
fatalism and a limited sense of control. In some ways this has 
been reinforced by set bagnet communities' relationships with 
outside ~evelopment organisations with which the people have 
often only had contact as a response to natural disasters. The 
perceptio n of outside agencies as providers of relief rather than 
as facilitators of social and economic development initiatives is 
very apparent. 
The communities live at the margins of society. They have little 
or no land other than that for housing, and their access to the 
natural resources upon which their livelihoods depend is 
insecure. They have limited access to non-fisheries resources, 
yet c an exert almost no influence over the management of the 
marine resource. The qovernment' s fisheries e:-:tension programmes 
are almost exclusively focused on inland fisheries, and its 
coastal fisheries policy only considers large-scale fishing 
activities. 
FISHERIES 
The fishing year in can broadly be divided into two seasons: the 
hilsa season and the set bagnet season. The former accounts for 
much of the value of the total catch, although the benefit to the 
set bagnet communities is reduced by their limited control over 
the factors of production. The set bagnet season is less 
important in terms of total value, but essential to the 
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subsistence of the communities. 
The set bagnet communities claim that the fish stock during both 
seasons is in decline; an opinion shared by the government. 
During the set bagnet season, this has driven the communities to 
use increasingly smaller mesh nets, and government and fisheries 
experts presume that this is depleting the stock of fingerlings 
and small fry. Whether decline in individual fisherfolk's 
catches is due to an actual decrease in the stock or rather an 
increase in the number of fisherfolk has never been calculated. 
The effect any reduction in the use of the set bagnet would have 
on the stock is also unknown. 
Despite the lack o f answers to these fundamental questions, there 
are moves afoot that could outlaw the use of the set bagnet. 
FAO-BOBP is advising the government on the feasibility of 
bringing in legislation which would then have to be discussed 
before becoming law. Although any legislation is a long way off 
(King pers. comm.), there are in any case doubts as to whether it 
could be enforced, and fisherfolk from the set bagnet communities 
have no option but to use set bagnets at present. But such 
legislation would technically make the fisherfolk from these 
communities illegal operators, further weakening their rights in 
relation to natural resources. 
However, t here is potential for increasing the value of the 
present catch to the set bagnet communities. In Rehania, for 
instance, a considerable portion of the cheuwa catch goes to 
waste because there is only a limited capacity within the 
community to process and market the fish. Rakhainpara is close 
to the large urban market of Cox's Bazar, but the community does 
not have the skills to dry and market the set bagnet catch which 
is landed on their nearby beach. In Delipara, although most of 
the hilsa catch is taken by traders, more than 25% of the catch 
goes to waste either because it cannot be collected from the nets 
80 
Blowfield & Haque 
or because of market gluts. In the short term, increasing the 
capability of the set bagnet communities to process this rejected 
fish would increase incomes. In the medium term the introduction 
of more boats able to go to the hilsa nets during bad weather 
would increase the amount of fish for sale. In the longer term, 
if dependency on current credit-marketing arrangements was 
reduced, the value of the catch to the fisherfolk could be 
increased through processing and storage. 
ECONOMIC ORGANISATION 
The major economic activity of the set bagnet communities is 
fishing. Those members unable to engage in fishing or without a 
relationship to fisherfolt are the most disadvantaged. 
This hierarchy is male-dominated. Present ambitions o f the 
fisherfolk are to move up the ladder. Thus, for instance, the 
marginal fisherman hopes to be able to afford a net; the small-
scale fisherman hopes to buy a boat; the medium-scale fisherman 
hopes to have a mechanised vessel. In reality, the number of 
people able to move up the ladder is decreasing in many 
communities, and natural disasters together with competition from 
capitalised landowners has led to a proportional increase in the 
number o f marginal and small scale fishermen. 
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Figure 1: Ladder of Economic Progress in Coastal Fishing 
Communities 
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Two of the three communities are from minority religious groups 
(Hindus and Buddhists) which in some cases can influence their 
relationship with the surrounding Muslim communities. Religion 
also influences the internal social mechanisms of the 
communities. For instance, in the Hindu Delipara community, the 
religious and social leadership are closely bound and include 
decision-making relating to fisheries. 
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In all communities the family is the main unit of economic 
cooperation, but the degree to which the extended family is 
important and the significance of family compared to community 
varies. For instance, in the Buddhist community of Rakhainpara 
men normally live in their wives' houses whereas in Hindu 
communities women move to the houses and villages of their 
husbands. Consequently widowed women in the Delipara Hindu 
community are in a weak position to call on support from the 
extended family and are dependent on the community as a whole for 
support. In Buddhist Rakhainpara, a widow still has contact with 
her extended family while widowers leave the community if they do 
not remarry. 
All communities have indigenous social institutions, although the 
degree of power they still hold varies. There are links with 
other communities, especially those of the same religion or 
ethnic group, although these serve a social rather than economic 
function. 
The relationship between community members and the sea is also 
partly determined by social norms. The Rakhain people, although 
traditionally fisherfolk, do not feel that they have cultural 
ties to the sea. The Rehania community is partly made up of 
settled cultivators who have only entered into fishing because 
they have lost their land in their original villages. Howev~r, 
the people of Delipara are from a fishing sub-caste, and their 
culture and social status is wholly inter-twined with fishing and 
the sea. 
But many of the problems facing the set bagnet communities cannot 
be addressed at the level of individual villages. The different 
set bagnet communities face many problems in common (e.g. rights 
of access, poor political representation, declining resources) 
and these can only be effectively addressed by the communities 
coming together as a group similar to those that represent the 
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interests of traders and cultivators. CODEC, a Chittagong-based 
NGO, is currently trying to establish a coastal fishing community 
federation, while AZAD, a local NGO working with the Rakhainpara 
community and others, has operated for several years by 
mobilising the resources of people in the Cox's Bazar area. 
GENDER 
Because women do not take part in fishing, they are denied access 
to the largest single source of income for the communities. In 
male-headed households they could expect to benefit from any 
improvement in the position of fishermen. But female-headed 
households are much more likely to be poor. 
Moreover, the nature of poverty in female-headed households is 
different from that in male-headed households. Women are 
involved in marketing fish but on a much smaller scale than male 
traders. Because capital is largely channelled through the 
fishing crews, they have much less access to credit, both for 
subsistence and investment. It is noticeable that where there 
are specific income-generating activities for women (e.g. 
weaving), these are adopted because they allow women to balance 
their basket of productive and reproductive responsibilities. 
Where women become the main bread-winner, these female-specific 
opportunities are 
In many communities, women are responsible for the children in 
the event of being widowed, divorced or separated from their 
husbands. In the Buddhist Rakhain set bagnet communities they 
are also responsible for elderly parents. In Muslim communities 
there are fewer female-headed households than in Buddhist or 
Hindu ones. But this reflects the Muslim communities' way of 
treating non-married women (e.g. through remarriage or being 
taken in by siblings and other relatives), rather than any lower 
level of divorce, separation etc. It does not appear to be the 
case that non-married women in Muslim set bagnet communities are 
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less disadvantaged than in other communities, and because of 
their invisibility it is consequently more difficult to address 
their needs. 
Women are not represented in indigenous social institutions, 
although they have shown themselves to be effective organisers in 
externally initiated activities such as education and savings and 
loans. But the opportunities for using such activities as 
catalysts for a broader range of development activities have not 
yet been fully exploited. 
MARKETING AND CREDIT 
Women often engage in fish marketing at a small-scale, and some 
male community members are fish traders. But the bulk of the 
fish trade is controlled by people from outside of the set bagnet 
communities. There are two basic types of external traders. One 
is the exclusive trader who buys fish at the landing site. The 
other is the dadondar who markets fish as part of a credit 
arrangement with the fisherfolk. 
The fisherfolk are very dependent on credit. When the catch is 
poor, especially during the set bagnet season, credit is required 
for subsistence. But it is also required to repair craft and 
prepare for the next fishing season. In return for credit, the 
dadondar has exclusive right to the fish caught by a boat-owner. 
In some communities this monopoly applies to hilsa, in other 
communities it can apply to the set bagnet catch. The dadondar 
assesses the value of the catch and deducts this amount from the 
boat-owner's loan for that season. Payment is not made until the 
end of the season when the value of the fish is offset against 
the amount of credit plus accumulated interest. If the loan is 
not repaid, the balance is carried over to the next year. 
Despite the high rates of interest charged on the loans and the 
tendency to value the fish at a significantly lower price than 
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other traders might be prepared to pay, the dadondar provides a 
readily accessible form of credit which is essential to many 
communities survival. Unlike formal sources of credit, the 
dadondar acknowledge the catch as a capital asset and are willing 
to lend money prior to the actual fish harvest. 
However, the dadondari system is pernicious because it creates a 
monopolised marketing system which gives the fisherfolk no choice 
or incentive. Any efforts to add value to the fish (e.g. through 
processing) would not benefit the fisherfolk because the dadondar 
pays them for catching not processing. By giving the fisherfolk 
a lower price than would be the case if the fish were marketed 
through normal traders, the dadondar effectively encourage over-
exploitation of the marine resource. Similarly, because of the 
low prices paid, the fisherfolk are deprived of the opportunity 
to accumulate capital for investment which could be invested in 
fishing, in non-fishing income generating activities and in 
improving the general conditions of the community (e.g. through 
improved education and health). 
Some attempts have been made to end dependence on dadondar 
through the setting up of savings and loans schemes by NGOs. 
While these have been successful as schemes with high rates of 
savings and repayment, they have not removed the dadondar. 
Partly this is because the total removal of the dadondar is 
unrealistic at the present time given the communities' need for 
credit at a time when the set bagnet catch is declining. It is 
also because of the rules of the dadondari system itself. The 
basic rule is that the cost of a loan is the entire catch. This 
applies regardless of the size of loan. Therefore a boat-owner 
who borrows Tk 1,000 and one who borrows Tk 100,000 are equally 
bound to hand over all their fish for an entire season and 
thereonafter until the loan is repaid. Thus savings and loans 
schemes that are slightly late in giving loans or unable to 
provide sufficient loans for a boat-owner's overall needs, cannot 
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release the communities from the dadondar's hold and possibly 
increase the chance that the loans will not be repaid. 
Figure 2: Relationship Between Credit Flow and Marketing 
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The impact of the savings and loans schemes on the dadondari 
system is also connected to the relationship between creditor and 
debtor. As Figure 2 shows, the dadondar do not interact directly 
with the set bagnet communities. The loans are provided by 
agents who are usually from farming families in neighbouring 
communities. They are not provided to individual fisherfolk, but 
to the boat-owners who then use this money for boat repair, 
preparation and advance payments to the crews. It is not 
therefore the case that the entire community is indebted to the 
87 
Caught In Their Own Nets 
dadondar. However, it is the boat-owner who controls the sale of 
fish and is the source of loans or advances for net-owners and 
waged crew members. Therefore if the boat-owner owes money to a 
dadondar, then his entire crew and their families are all 
affected. 
The strength of the dadondari hold differs from community to 
community. It is also affected by the impact of natural 
disasters, and where a community has been severely affected with 
the loss of most capital assets (e.g. Delipara after the 1991 
cyclone), the grip is very strong indeed. The dadondar are also 
part of a strong economic and political mechanism that e~tends 
way beyond the fishing villages. 
Although unable to replace the dadondari system, savings and 
loans groups have been shown to work in set bagnet communities. 
Alone they provide an alternative source of credit alongside 
dadondar, local traders and informal money-lenders. Larger 
credit schemes such as those of the Gramin Bank, do not appear to 
reach the coastal fishing communities. Moreover, the savings and 
loans schemes can provide an important catalyst for community 
organisation which in turn acts as a motor for other development 
activities. 
ORGANISATION AND REPRESENTATION 
The government's fisheries programme pays almost no attention to 
the situation of set bagnet communities. A few NGOs have 
programmes with coastal fishing communities, and these have been 
working with cAO-BOBP for the past year or more. Certain 
individual set bagnet communities are covered by these 
programmes, but they tend to be general packages rather than 
addressing the specific needs of the set bagnet fishery. Most 
communities do not receive regular assistance from development 
organisations, although many had contact with relief workers 
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after the 1991 cyclone. 
In developing programmes, one of the most commonly identified 
needs is the issue of credit because certain aspects of the 
existing money-lending system prove a major obstacle to 
sustainable development initiatives. Community savings and loans 
schemes have performed well where they have been established, and 
women's groups especially have benefited the most disadvantaged 
in the community. Moreover, such groups can serve as catalysts 
for a broader range of social and economic development 
activities. As ODA-PHFP case studies from India show, a broader 
role for such groups is both an efficient way of implementing 
activities and desirable for group sustainability (Rogers & 
Blowfield, 1993). 
As mentioned earlier, inter-community organisation has not 
received much attention in the past, although it is increasingly 
recognised that without networking and cooperation the 
marginalised set bagnet communities will continue to be at a 
disadvantage compared to agriculturalists and other interest 
groups. 
Both government and NGOs are weak in their technical capacity to 
meet coastal fisheries-related needs. The government's extension 
staff are not involved in coastal fisheries in the three studied 
communities, while NGO staff r~rely have fisheries expertise. 
BOBP-eAO pre-harvest fisheries conducted a training and outreach 
programme in the early 1990s to increase the technical and 
organisational skills of NGO and government personnel and to 
encourage working with coastal fishing communities. There are 
many lessons to be learnt from this programme (Roy, ?????), but 
despite the problems of later sustainability encountered, the 
programme proved that the capacity of both government and NGOs 
can be enhanced effectively. 
The BOBP-eAO work provided the model upon which BOBP-ODA's 
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sustainable income enhancement activity was built . This activity 
is still continuing and should be coordinated with the set bagnet 
community programme. 
NGOs also have a limited capacity to identify and analyse policy 
issues relating to set bagnet commun ities . The skills required 
to conduct policy work will become increasingly i mportant as 
awareness of the need fo r networking and cooperat ive action 
grows . The same skills would also benefit government officials 
in developing more appropriate coastal fi sheries policies . 
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Annex 1: Study Guidelines 
SET BAGNET COMMUNITIES SOCIO-ECONOMIC BASELINE STUDY 
STUDY GU IT'IELINES 
Objectives 
The objectives of the study, as set out in the Project Outline, 
are as follows: 
• To research, describe and analyse from the perspective of 
poor fisherfolk the social and economic system in three 
villages engaging in set bagnet fishing activity. 
• To make availa ble the result s of the above research in a 
form ( s ) usab le by o rganisat ions working with set bagnet 
fishing commu nities a s i npu t into their planning and 
moni tori ng act ivit i es . 
Locations 
The study will be implemented in three villages chosen based on 
the following criteria: 
• The estuarine set bagnet fishery is a major contributor to 
the livel i hood 0 f the fisherf o lk i n the v illage. 
• Villages represent different types o f technical and 
marketing constraints and opportunities. 
• Each village represents a different religious/cultural mix. 
• Potential to coordinate study implementation and findings 
with the BOBP-funded Sustainable Income Enhancement project. 
• The villages are in stratum covered by the BOBP bio socio-
economic study. 
• Villagers are willlng to participate in the study. 
(Provisional village locations are: North Salimpur village 
[Latifpor area of Chittagong], one village in the Cox's Bazaar 
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region, and one village on Hatia island.) 
Methodology 
The study will compile primary longitudinal data (thirteen 
months) on the three villages with an emphasis on qualitative 
data supplemented by limited quantitative data over the same 
period, and secondary data to provide a historical perspective. 
Primary data will be compiled using selected community 
participatory techniques (e.g. mapping, wealth ranking, village 
histories), plus selective household case studies, open-ended 
interviews with randomly selected villagers and non-villager r.ey 
respondents. Given the eztended period available, emphasis will 
be placed on personal relationships rather than a pre-determined 
selection of study techniques. 
Provisional Data Analysis Framework 
Based on previous studies (e.g. Bennett 1991; Thomson et al 
1993), input from the first workshop of the Sustained Income 
Enhancement project, and the study team's preliminary visit to a 
selection of set baqnet fishing communities in the Chittaqonq 
area, the following provisional framework for analysis has been 
developed: 
Fishing Other Marketing/ Social and Resource 
Activity Economic Trade Reproduc- Ownership 
Activity tive /Access 
(including Activity 
debt/-
credit) 
Household 
Gender 
1 Age 
Economic 
Class 
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Caste 
Residence 
Religion 
Season 
Preliminary Focus Areas 
The study will provide sufficient data to describe and analyse 
the following aspects of the social and economic life in the 
three villages, and other aspects as arise during the study's 
implementation: 
Village social 
structure 
• Map of the village including: 
- location and classification of 
buildings; 
- name, age, religion and sex of household 
heads; 
- number of household members; 
- occupation of household members; 
- villager-assessed wealth ranking of 
households; 
- family ties of different househo l ds; 
- resources used by the community. 
• History of the village. 
• Description of village power structure 
including: 
- control over the resources (Who has the 
power to allocate?); 
- the role of religion; 
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- the role of gender; 
- the role of family; 
- the role of economically-determined 
relationships (e.g. trader-fisher, boat 
owner-boat user, small trader-large 
trader, employer-employee). 
• Description of the economic activities of 
the village covering: 
- all types of activity; 
- who carries out the activities; 
- how much time is spent on each activity; 
- when is the ~ctivity carried out ( time 
of day, time of month, time of year, time 
of life-cycle, etc); 
- the economic value of the activity (for 
production, for reproduction) . 
• Description of the social activities of 
the village covering: 
- all types of activity; 
- who is involved in the activities; 
- how much time is spent on each activity; 
- when is the activity carried out (time 
of day, time o f month, time of year, time 
of life-cycle, etc) . 
• Identification of formal and info rma l 
social and economic alliances wi th i n t he 
village, for instance: 
- trader groups; 
- religious groups; 
- fishing groups; 
- loan groups; 
iv 
External relations 
Household and 
extended family case 
studies 
• 
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- community groups; 
- cooperation, conflict and conflict 
resolution. 
Identification and description of non-
residents' interaction with the social and 
economic life of the village, for 
instance: 
- traders buying from the village 
(including villagers' selling outside of 
the village); 
- traders selling to the village 
(including villagers' interaction with 
local markets); 
- consumers; 
- local farming communities; 
- religious affiliations; 
- government. 
• Description of conflict with external 
parties and its resolution. 
Case studies will be built up of a c r oss -
section of ho useholds using class ifica tions 
deve loped du r ing the preliminary village 
rnapp inq ezercise . Poss ible class ifications 
wil l include households of differen t religions , 
house holds of different wealth , households with 
different economi c activities, male a nd fema le 
headed households , et c . 
• Description of the household and extended 
family structure, including the following 
aspects: 
-family history (2-3 generations); 
- current household membership; 
- relationship of current household 
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members ; 
- outward migration ; 
- economic activities of household members 
(past and present) ; 
- social activities of household members 
(past and present) . 
• Description of the economic activities of 
the household members including : 
• 
- types of activity; 
- labour arrangements ; 
- time spent (amount and when ) ; 
- capital invescment (amount and tjpe) ; 
- operational costs (amount and type) ; 
- rela tionships evolving from the 
different activities . 
Description of the production and 
reproduction systems of the household 
including : 
- diet; 
- clothing and shelter; 
- health ; 
- sources of cash income and other basic 
needs ' inputs , and their respective 
values ; 
- expenditures ; 
- saving and investment (long- term and 
short - term) . 
• Description of trading relations 
including : 
- credit systems (amounts, seasons , use , 
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production and 
marketing 
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etc); 
- trading groups and individual traders; 
- impact of trading relations on 
livelihood strategies. 
Description of the fish catch including: 
- types and size of gear used; 
- amounts of gear used and 
ownership/access; 
- types of boat used; 
- number of boats used and 
ownership/access; 
- types of fish caught during different 
seasons using different gears; 
- quantities of different fish types 
caught during different seasons using 
different gears. 
• Description of the utilisation of the fish 
catch including: 
- amount of fish sold (by individual, by 
type and by season); 
- to whom fish is sold (by individual, by 
type and season}; 
- prices of fish (including the impact of 
debt/credit arrangements); 
- amount of fish for own consumption (by 
individual, by type and season). 
• Description of the marketing of the fish 
catch at different levels within and 
outside of the village, including: 
- amount of fish bought {by type of fish 
and by season); 
-who buys fish (by type and by season); 
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- who is fish then sold to (by trader , by 
type and by season) ; 
- prices of fish at different levels o f 
trade chain ; 
- amount of fish for own consumption (by 
trader, by type and by season) . 
• The position of poor fisherfolk in the context of their 
immediate community (e . g . farmers , non- fish traders) . 
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Annex 2: Project Frameworks Resulting from Study 
Goals: 
a. Enhanced sustainability of 
l ivelihood strategies amongst 
the present population of 
coastal fishing communities in 
Bangladesh. 
• 
• 
Objectively Verifiable 
Indicators 
Increased diversity of 
economic activities by 
set bagnet communities. 
Increased skills base of 
the communities. 
• Increased representation 
of communities in 
relation to local and 
na':ional development. 
b. Re du ced pressure fr om I • Increased diversity of 
non-fisheries income 
generating activities in 
se': bagnet communities. 
economic exploitation on the 
marine resource in Bangladesh. 
• Increased non-fisheries 
skills base within the 
communities. 
• Enhanced economic value 
of the existing fish 
ca':ch. 
• Improved policy-making 
capacity in relation to 
the marine resource. 
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Means of Verification Assumptions 
Purpose: 
To develop models of 
institutional support for 
assisting set bagnet 
communities in establishing 
socially equitable approaches 
towards sustainable poverty 
alleviation through addressing 
post-harvest fisheries 
concerns. 
• 
• 
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Objectively Verifiable 
Indicators 
Three models of working 
with set bagnet 
communities through 
different-sized 
intermediary 
institutions. 
Institution building 
activities for at least 
ten development 
organisations/agencies 
working with set bagnet 
communities. 
X 
Means of Verification 
Evaluation of gender-
impact. 
Evaluation of impact by 
socio-economic level 
within the community. 
Evaluation of 
institutional 
sustainability and 
replicabili ty. 
• 
• 
• 
Assumptions 
Climatic conditions 
permit project 
implementati o n as 
scheduled. 
Fish catch is suffici 
each season not to 
disrupt economic life 
communities. 
NGOs continue to have 
the resources to oper 
their overall 
programmes. 
Output: 
1.1 Development of 
institutional models for 
addressing post-harvest 
fisheries issues in set b agnet 
communities. 
Activity: 
1.1.1 Development and 
implementation of community-
level training course in basic 
fish handling, processing and 
marketing. 
1.1.2 Enhancement of community 
a c cess to formal third party 
sources of credit, capital, 
marketing channels and 
alternative (non-fisheries} 
income generating 
opportunities. 
• 
• 
• 
o.v. I. 
Three models developed 
and field-tested working 
through three different 
institutional frameworks 
(one medium-si zed NGO, 
one l ocal llGO, ::me 
community group}. 
Materials developed. 
Training course 
implemented in three 
communities. 
• Experiences from courses 
used as input into 
Output 1.2. 
• 
• 
• 
Sources of credit and 
capital identified. 
Information disseminated 
to three communities. 
Community groups formed 
in three communities. 
xi 
• 
• 
• 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
Bl owfield & Ha3 ue 
Means of Verification 
Project records . 
Assessment by 
participating 
organisations. 
Evaluaticn by OL=I.-I-HFP 
nru. 
Assessment of materials . 
Project records . 
Uptake in Output 1.2 
Pro ject records. 
Dissemination materials . 
Community evaluation. 
• 
Assumotions 
Output 1.2 implemented 
as scheduled. 
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1.1.3 Increased availability of • 
seed capital for post-harvest 
fisheries including processing 
and marketing. 
Three sustainable and 
replicable institutional 
models of finan c ial 
service s in different 
institutional settings. 
• Seed capital 
proportionally available 
to all socio-economic 
categories of the 
communities. 
• Seed capital 
proportionally available 
to male and female 
groups. 
• 90: repa}went of loans 
to management body. 
Project records. 
1.1.4 Increased availability of • 
seed capital for alternative 
(non-fisheries) income 
Three sustainable and 
replicable institutional 
models of financial 
services in different 
institutional settings. 
generating activities. 
• Seed capital 
proportionally available 
to all socio-economic 
categories of the 
commun i ties. 
• Seed capital 
propo rtionally available 
to ma l e and female 
groups. 
• 90~ repa }~ent of loans 
to management body. 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Means of Veri fication 
Project records. 
Group records . 
Community evaluation. 
Project records . 
Group records . 
Community evaluation. 
• 
• 
Assumptions 
Where existing NGO 
financial servi c es 
exits, NGOs are able to 
adapt these to specific 
set bagnet community 
needs. 
Where existing NGO 
financial serv i c es 
exits, NGOs are able to 
adapt these to specific 
set bagnet community 
needs. 
O.V.I. 
1.1.5 Increased availability oB • 
female-specific seed capital. 
Three sustainable and 
replicable institutional 
models of financial 
services in different 
institutional settings. 
1.1.6 Increased capacity of 
community groups to represent 
community interests. 
Output: 
1.2 Enhanced capacity of 
government and NGOs to answer 
the specific needs of set 
bagnet communities. 
• Seed capital available 
to women for productive 
and repr o ductive 
(consumpti v e) 
activities. 
• 90 ~ repay~ent of loans 
to management body. 
• Male and female groups 
formed in three 
communities. 
• Groups able to develop, 
implement and manage 
programme of activities. 
• Communities able to 
conduct community 
e val ua t icns. 
• 
O.V.I. 
Enhanced skills base of 
DOF and at least 10 NGOs 
working with set bagnet 
communities. 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
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Means of Verification 
Project records. 
Group records. 
Community evaluation. 
Community evaluation . 
Project records. 
Means of Verification 
Assessment by NGOs and 
DO F. 
Evaluation by ODA-PHFP 
!MU. 
• 
• 
Assumptions 
Where existing NGO 
financial services 
exits, NGOs are able to 
adapt these to specific 
set bagnet community 
needs. 
As swn_Q_tion s 
DOF willing to 
participate on regular 
basis. 
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Activity: • 
1.2.1 Development and • 
implementation of institution-
level training course in post-
harvest fisheries technology. 
o.v. I. 
Training materials. 
Participation of 
representatives of DOF 
and at least 10 NGOs in 
training course. 
• At least three community 
1.2.2 Development and 
implementation of institution-
level training course in 
marketing for set bagnet 
communities. 
• 
• 
level training 
acti vities run using 
knowledge gained from 
the course. 
Training materials. 
Participation of 
representatives of DOF 
and at least 10 NGOs in 
training course. 
• At least three community 
level training 
activities run using 
knowledge gained from 
the course. 
xiv 
• 
• 
Means of Veri fication 
Assessment by 
participants. 
Project records . 
Assessment by 
participants. 
Project records . 
• 
• 
Assumptions 
Community-level 
activities can be 
implemented within 
project time-frame. 
Community-level 
activities can be 
implemented within 
project time-frame. 
1.2.3 Strengthening 
institutional capacity in 
relation to gender issues in 
set bagnet communities. 
1.2.4 Core support to set 
bagnet community representation 
network. 
1.2.5 Strengthening 
institutional capacity in 
relation to policy issues 
concerning set bagnet 
communities. 
1.2.6 Support for community 
level activities arising from 
above training courses. 
• 
O.V . I. 
Women in development 
issues affecting set 
bagnet communities 
identified. 
• Three training 
activities on women in 
development issues 
affecting set bagnet 
communities implemented. 
• At least three 
NGOs/community 
organisations 
incorporating set bagnet 
community-specific WID 
issues in their 
programmes. 
• 
• 
• 
At least 30 set bagnet 
communities 
participating in 
network. 
Major policy issues 
identified. 
Information disseminated 
on major issues to 
government and NGOs. 
• Policy-related training 
needs identified. 
• One policy-related 
skills training course 
implemented. 
• Five training activities 
implemented by NGOs 
and/or government. 
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• 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
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cation 
NGO assessment . 
Evaluation by ODA-PHFP 
IMU. 
Project records. 
Project records. 
Disseminated materials . 
Project records. 
Evaluation by ODA-PHFP 
IMU. 
Assumptions 
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O.V.I. Means of Verificati on AssumPtions 
Output: Project administration. • Administrative and ~ Project documentation 
logistic support to 
above outputs and 
acti ?i ties. 
Activity: 
Training in community • Three ODA-PHFP staff ~ Training documentation . 
evaluation. trained in community Results of community • 
evaluation techniques. 
evaluation. 
• Availability of 
community evaluation 
results for e:<ternal 
evaluator. 
Routine administration . • Admini strati ve • Projw::t resords . 
requirements of project 
realised. 
External evaluation. • Annual external • Written rep::)rts . 
evaluations conducted. 
Staff recruitment . • Appointment of suitable • External evaluation of • Expert personnel of 
women in development appointees' work. necessary quality are 
coordinator. available. 
• Appointment of suitable 
coordinator for three 
pilot models. 
• Appointment of 
consultants as required. 
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Annex 3: Aakhainpara Case Studies 
Rakhainpara Case Study 1 
MA SEN DA (HH code 53) 
Ma Sen Da is 50 years old and has been separated from her husband for 
many years now. She has built her livelihood on two occupations: 
fabric trading and weaving of traditional handloom fabrics. 
At nineteen, she was given in marriage to a man from the Moghpara in 
Choupaldondi union. Her husband could barely make ends meet, was 
lazy, and did not want to work. Soon, she realised he had too many 
bad habits to be reconciled with, and two years after their marriage, 
she left her husband's home to return to her parent's. When she did 
so, she had with her one son of four months. 
Rakhain tradition holds that if a father passes away or 
divorces/separates with the mother, the mother will have custody of 
the child(ren). A woman who is widowed/divorced/separated may marry 
again, but little evidence is found of this happening. 
About thirty years have passed since then, and Ma Sen Da's child has 
grown up, married and for the last seven years has lived in another 
Rakhain community in his father-in-law's home as is customary. She 
looks after her very old father as her mother ~assed away a few years 
ago. 
Ma Sen Da goe s to Cox ' s Bazar to buy fabric (for making ready-made 
armencs ) , l adies blouse , petticoDts , 3nd children ' wear. She sells 
these from door to door a mongst t he Rakhain as well as in the 
surrounding Muslim communitie s . Her daily income from this venturing 
fetches Tk 70- 80 . 3he al so has a loom which she operates in her 
spare t ime . Her household monthly expense comes to Tk 2,000 which 
she manages from these t wo occupations. 
Ma Sen Da's household belongings are listed below: 
01. aluminium cooking pots (patil) 5 pes. 
02. aluminium cooking pots (dekchi) 2 pes. 
03. aluminium jug 2 pes. 
04. aluminium glass 2 pes. 
05. aluminium plate 3 pes. 
06. aluminium bowl 2 pes. 
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-07 . aluminium dish 1 pc . 
08 . aluminium water holder {kalash) 2 pes . 
09 . ceramic saucer (quarter plates) 4 pes. 
10 . ceramic bowl 3 pes . 
11. cap/hat 2 pes. 
12 . blanket (katha) 2 pes . 
13. pillow 3 pes . 
14 . wooden bench 2 pes . 
15 . wooden handloom 1 pc . 
16 . wooden chair 2 pes . 
17 . clothes 4 sets . 
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Rakhainpara case study 2 
MONG CHING AUNG (HH Code 78) 
Mong is 37 years old and has a son who turned two this year. His 
four daughters are twelve, nine, seven and four years old. He has 
two mechanised fishing boats with 22 and 33 hp engines. He also has 
four set bagnets . 
Mong has been married for fourteen years now , to a woman from the 
Rakhain community in Ramu . He started going to sea on fishing boats 
with his father three years before his marriage. He has been living 
away from his parents for seven years now . He was given a set bagnet 
at that t ime by his father . 
He started off his new life as a majhi with the set bagnet and, in a 
years time made enough to save Tk 10,000. With his savings and Tk 
40,000 loaned from his father in law, Mong bought a boat with a 10 hp 
engine and started as a bohoddar. In his second year, he made two 
more nets. 
During 1991-92, his net earning after meeting all expenses was Tk 
80,000. He had to pay a fat interest on the loan and was left with 
Tk 45,000. He again took out a loan and bought another (his fourth) 
net and a boat powered with a 24 h.p. engine. 
During 1992-93, his income was Tk 96,000, and after paying interests 
charged, had Tk 50,000 left. After paying for the boat and net he 
had hardly any money and so had to resort to borrowing once again. 
During 1993-94, he obtained a loan at an interest rate of Tk 50 per 
Tk 1000 per month. 
This year, he has netted enough fish to earn Tk 90,000. He paid Tk 
50,000 as interest, and was left with Tk 40,000. Under Mong's 
bohoddari are team of two majhi and fourteen crew members. 
An estimate of Mong's annual expenses is given: 
daily food and other necessities = @ Tk 
annually 
medical care (incl doctor's fee) == 
Tk 
Tk 
50 
18,000 
1,500 
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-
entertaining relations + guests = Tk 2 , 500 
clothes and footwear = Tk 3 , 500 
religious ceremonies = Tk 2 , 500 
educational expenses = Tk 2 , 500 
miscellaneous = Tk 2 , 000 
total annual expense = Tk 32 , 500 
An estimate of how the majhi and the crew share entitlement is 
described : 
All the costs before and during the fishing season are borne by the 
bohoddar . After all costs of the fishing expeditions are met , the 
income ~s distributed as f o llows : 
The majhi gets 2 shares out of sixteen equal shares ; 
Each crew member gets 1 share ; 
Before each season , each of the two majhi ' s are given an advance of 
Tk 4, 000 , and each c rew is given Tk 2 , 000 . 
The responsibility for the boat at sea is entirely with the majhi . 
A list 0f the fishing teams under Mong ' s bohoddari is described 
below : 
sl hhcode name and position in team 
01 51 Chwa La Aung , majhi , s/o Sha Mong ; 
02 77 Sing Mong , majhi 
03 60 Aung Thoi Pru , crew 
04 24 Alung , c rew 
05 76 U Ching Mong , crew 
06 38 U Ba Sing , c rew 
07 67 Aung Sing , crew 
08 77 U Thoin Mong , cre1rJ s/o Sing Mong code 77 ; 
09 82 Mong Thoi We , crew s/o Le Ri ; 
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10 67 Ching Thoi Aung , crew 
11 18 Aung Khaw Mwa , c rew 
12 42 Ka Mong , c rew 
13 Mohesh* Mong Thoi , c rew, 
14 Chopo1* Mong Kw a Thoi , c r ew 
15 Ramu* 
16 Ramu* 
notes : 
Mohesh* 
ChopolJ< 
Ramu'" 
Aung Ching La , c rew 
Ne Wa Mong , c rew 
member of Rakhain community settled in Moheshkhali ; 
member of Rakhai~ community settled in Chopoldondi ; 
member of Rakhain community settled in Ramu . 
GLOSSARY 
aratdar 
AZAD 
behundi jal 
bera 
bohoddar 
chanda 
chandi 
CODEC 
dadondar 
dittiya 
far 
ha at 
hilsa 
jo 
jol kar 
jolodas 
kalshi 
kat ha 
kati 
khol 
rnajh i 
mandir 
maund 
mukkho 
paikar 
panchami 
poon 
po unna 
poa 
prasad 
samity 
sardari/sardar 
seer 
leading figure in fish trading network 
Cox ' s Bazar NGO 
set bagnet 
bamboo fence 
fishing boat - owner (often also the 
operator) 
pomfret 
hilsa net (Rehania) 
Coastal Development Centre - a Chittagong-
based NGO 
fish- trader cum money- lender 
second day of full moon 
the nets and poles used for catching hilsa 
measurement of length/size 
fortnightly peak fishing period during hilsa 
season 
fishing tax 
fishing sub- caste of Hindu believers 
brass water- container 
type o f clothing 
basket used as measure for selling hilsa 
unmechanised fishing boat (Rehanial 
leader 0 f fishing team 
temple 
unit of weight measure ( 37 . 5 kg) 
secretary to Sardar 
medi um- sized fish trader 
fifth day of full moon 
measurement of fish quanity (80 pieces) 
net-owners using another persons boat 
croaker 
religious food offe r ings 
CODEC-run savings & loans group 
Delipara community leadership system 
0 . 9 kg 
shall ish 
Shitola 
Sraboni l?urnima 
tempo 
thana 
Tk 
tong 
Blowf ield & Haque 
form of traditional legal t rial 
Hindu deity 
Hindu sea goddess 
mechan ised boat (Rehania ) 
governmen t adminstrative area 
taka (Bangladesh currency ) 
hilsa net (De lipara) 
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